

RHETORIC FOR CROWDS

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UDK: 808.5 * 316.77
DOI: 10.15291/csi.4442
Pregledni članak
Primljen: 11. 8. 2023.
Prihvaćen za tisak: 19. 4. 2024.

Gustave Le Bon's eminent work *The Crowd* is considered as one of the fundamental works in mass psychology. Concurrently, the importance of this work and the impact it had on communication practices has been recently recognized by some of the scholars. While *The Crowd* primarily places focus on meticulous description of origin and psychological condition of the crowd, this paper suggests that, among others, Le Bon uses psychological discourse to define rhetorical precept that can be used as an agency for eliciting such condition. It is the purpose of this paper to extract and present the guidelines suggested by Le Bon in his work for mass oratory and corroborate it with apposite rhetorical theory in order to lend credibility to this thesis. Through broader treatment of rhetorical modes of pathos (state and language that induces it), orator, oration, and kairos (the right moment), with other hitherto rhetorical and linguistic insights, Le Bon constitutes activation means for evoking the psychological phenomena of the crowd. This paper represents Le Bon's explicit and implicit rhetorical instructions in *The Crowd* by constructing the rhetorical model and indicating that his scholarly contribution was rhetorical as was psychological, suggesting consideration of his inclusion in the history of rhetoric and his contribution to the development of contemporary communication practices. This paper represents an interdisciplinary rhetorical model that engages the field of interest of various scientific disciplines, such as linguistics, rhetoric, communicology, public relations, and their subbranches.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI:

apostle, crowd, images, prestige, unconscious

1. INTRODUCTION

Gustave Le Bon, French physician and scientist, who lived in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century (1841–1931), whose work covered scientific fields of anthropology, social psychology, physics, and medicine, left a mark with his most eminent work *The Crowd* (1896). This work is considered as one of the central works in mass psychology, explicating the origin, condition, stimulus, and behaviour of the crowd¹.

Since Le Bon does not explicitly attribute the crowd phenomena to rhetoric per se, it is the central goal of this paper to emphasize that there is a correlation between rhetoric and its impact on the crowd. Le Bon does, however, provide notions on several occasions that lead to conclusion that it is familiarity of hereditary social patterns and ideas which could be taken as elements partaking in rhetorical invention, as well as the rhetorical ability of the orator that contribute to instigation of the crowd phenomena. In the case of the former, the example indicates that “Napoleon had a marvellous insight into the psychology of the masses of the country over which he reigned, but he, at times, completely misunderstood the psychology of crowds belonging to other races” (Le Bon 1896: xxi). For the latter, an individual “allows himself to be impressed by words and images – which would be entirely without action on each of the isolated individuals composing the crowd – and to be induced to commit acts contrary to his most obvious interests and his best-known habits. An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will” (Le Bon 1896: 13). The management of these words and images is not derived from improvisation but from capabilities of the leader which is clearly stated in the following notion: “to know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the same time the art of governing them” (Le Bon 1896: 60–61). Whether the crowd is heroic or criminal “depends on the nature of the suggestion to which the crowd is exposed” (Le Bon 1896: 14).

Additional arguments support the rhetorical importance of *The Crowd*, as evidenced by the resemblance between the theses suggested by Le Bon with those of various philosophers, scientists, and linguists, such as H. Spencer, Fontanier, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Campbell, and Weber, Nietzsche, Darwin, Lamarck, Tarde, and Sighele among others. Furthermore, from a rhetorical perspective, Le Bon’s theses are expounded through broader treatment of pathos as psychological characteristics of the audience (unconsciousness, sentiments, passions, and instincts), analyses of the orator

¹ Le Bon (1896: 10) differentiates the term mass as a gathering consisting of indeterminate individuals conjoined without explicit reason from the term crowd, which signifies defined, organized, and directed agglomerate of individuals, stripped of their individual personality, and governed by the unconscious which originates in its historical legacy.

and oratory as well as *kairos* (the right time to speak). In addition, some of the well-known historical public figures, many of whom are controversial or infamous, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, etc., ascribed significant, sometimes exclusive, influence of *The Crowd* on their oratory (Ohlberg 2015: 162); hence, the analysis of this work from a rhetorical perspective seems valid. It also seems appropriate to acknowledge that Le Bon has been brought into correlation with rhetoric (Childers 2012), but to my conversance, *The Crowd* in particular has not been noted in the history of rhetoric as a discipline. These arguments, among others, indicate Le Bon's contribution to the 20th and 21st century communication as well-grounded².

Even though *The Crowd* is often attributed to psychological domain, the work itself can be seen as formatted using four rhetorical modes written in psychological discourse, resembling rhetorical works from the British Enlightenment period (Walzer 2017: 523), due to which it probably evaded being regarded as a rhetorical piece. In *The Crowd*, pathos, orator, oration, and *kairos* all partake as rhetorical elements that contribute to activation of the crowd phenomena. A brief definition of the crowd would assume it as a group of individuals in a state of mental unity (Ramsey 2017: 239) that share the inherited unconscious³, i.e., pathos, constituted by hereditary social patterns and ideas. From a more extensive perspective, a crowd in an ordinary sense of the word implies "a gathering of individuals of whatever nationality, profession, or sex, and whatever be the chances that have brought them together" (Le Bon 1896: 1). The crowds that are the subject of Le Bon's inquiry are those termed as organized or psychological crowds. These crowds occur only under particular circumstances where all personality or individuality dissolves, which enables the genesis of collective mind or the state of mental unity. Turning the feelings and thoughts in a definite direction represents a sign of a crowd becoming organized (Le Bon 1896: 2). However, each particular crowd is subjected to various factors, i.e., "its organization varies not only according to race and composition, but also according to the nature and intensity of the exciting causes to which crowds are subjected" (Le Bon 1896: 3). For this reason, Le Bon does not venture in particular causes even though he suggests that one of these

² Besides political figures, *The Crowd* influenced theorists interested in mass, analytical psychology, and psychoanalysis. Freud (1949: 10) attributes Le Bon's initial contribution to the study of the unconscious phenomenon in human behaviour. Via Freud, he further influenced the practical work of Freud's nephew, reputed as »the father of propaganda« and later public relations, Edward Bernays, who based some of his work on Le Bon's theses (Childers 2014: 78).

³ Le Bon establishes the unconscious from his previous research and racial theories, i.e., what has been integrated into the consciousness of historical races throughout their history.

could be represented in a form of “great national event” (Le Bon 1896: 3). Based on the examples provided in *The Crowd*, one can assert that the crowds which Le Bon deals with are of social origin such as the French Revolution, collective undertakings, and institutional transformations. Hence, the events that cause the crowd can be varying as long as they are momentous. Natural disasters or sporting events could represent the events that gather individuals in the crowd in the ordinary sense of the word, but once the thoughts and feelings in such crowds become directed in one unambiguous direction by, for instance, chants suggested by the leader of the club supporters or a small number of ardent fans, it forms an organized or psychological crowd in Le Bon’s sense of the word. Hence, it appears that one of the essential elements of any organized crowd is a leader, the catalyst who incites and steers the crowd with a specific type of suggestive oratory in a particular direction. Le Bon continuously provides examples of leaders and dedicates an entire chapter to them.

The oratory consists of means that evoke mental images through the use of tropes, irrational persuasion, analogies and associations, authoritarian affirmations, suggestions and repetition, mythological structure, and simplified language. Such oration leads to contagion⁴ which further stimulates the crowd’s pathos, making an individual lose control over his/her instincts, thus becoming maximally impulsive (Le Bon 1896: 45), increasing his/her suggestibility and causing absolute submission to the leader. The leader is bound on the apostolate of the idea, with impeccable credibility, meddlesome authority, and personal prestige, which make the idea of the speech indisputable and persuasive.

Stressing the significance of *The Crowd* on the oratory of the 20th and 21st century along with explicit and implicit rhetorical instructions it encompasses, this paper analyses Le Bon’s study of the psychology of the crowd from a rhetorical perspective, verifies his comprehension of such rhetoric by accentuating corresponding rhetorical and linguistic insights, and corroborates it with hitherto applicable theories, which eventually implicates the rhetorical model for the crowds.

2. PATHOS

As it will become evident in the following sections, this rhetorical model is largely characterized by psychological discourse. Along with this, the resemblance of some of the rhetorical theses in Le Bon’s work can be considered as highly indicative of

⁴ Le Bon refers to contagion as the spread of emotions and behaviours among individuals in the crowd that transforms it into one mental being.

the assumptive influence of George Campbell's view of rhetoric on Le Bon. What distinguished Campbell's view of rhetoric at that time was his revolutionary approach to rhetorical invention (Ehninger 1950). More precisely, Campbell held that rhetoric represents "that art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end" (Campbell 1988: 1). By implementing hitherto conception of faculty psychology proposed by Thomas Reid (Brooks 1976), the ends of discourse represent enlightening the understanding, pleasing the imagination, moving passions, or influencing will (Campbell 1988: 1). Accordingly, the rhetorical invention is directed by most recent epistemology which implies the implementation of contemporary scientific findings on what can be affirmed as universal principles of the nature of the human mind (Ehninger 1950; 1952; 1992; Weinsheimer 2021). Therefore, rhetorical invention prioritizes the "investigation into those principles of mind by which hearers would be led to understand and to believe what he (orator) was going to say" (Ehninger 1950: 274). Hence, "the orator need not be an expert logician, but he must be a keen student of practical psychology" (Ehninger 1950: 274). These tenets suggest that in order for rhetorical act to achieve its end, it must consider all of the available and relevant psychological findings (Weinsheimer 2021). What distinguishes Le Bon's rhetorical model is that it shifts the focus from psychological faculties which held a central place in Campbell's rhetorical invention and adopts a similar epistemological approach where invention is based on the meticulous study of the psychological phenomenon of the crowd. The term pathos hence seems applicable since some of its significations indicate both being in a given state or condition and a "kind of language that can induce such state" (Green 2001: 574).

Conceived in this manner, pathos has a central role in rhetoric for crowds since such rhetoric is determined by psychological principles of the crowd which are consequently used to elicit such a state, thusly conditioning both the orator and the oration. Generally, it is typical for pathos-based rhetoric to unsettle or arouse, making it so fierce that only a few men can resist it (Meyer et al. 2008: 53). However, as it is presented further in this section, Le Bon's concept of pathos represents a more complex and stratified phenomenon in contrast to different types of pathos systematized by Aristotle (Brinton 1988: 208). Besides its rational dimension, language is equally capable of arousing emotions through imaginative and depictive expression that has impelled human action throughout history. Presuming that rational thinking, intellect, and erudition are virtues⁵ possessed by a minority, Le Bon grounds such rhetoric on passions, sentiments, feelings,

⁵ Only a few people are capable of thinking, yet everyone wants to have an opinion (Schopenhauer 2002: 51).

and instincts that draw their origin from the inherited unconscious and are therefore common to most members of the human race. Oration, in order to have an equal effect on the “mathematician and his boot maker” (Le Bon 1896: 39)⁶, must adjust itself to pathos. Comprehension of pathos is therefore a prerequisite for understanding the selection of rhetorical means capable of inducing such a state.

According to Le Bon, there are three elements of pathos that rhetorical invention must consider:

- The inherited unconscious
- Remote factors of the opinions and beliefs of crowds
- Immediate factors of the opinions and beliefs of crowds.

2.1. *THE INHERITED UNCONSCIOUS*

The inherited unconscious as the first element does not deviate from other acknowledged theories on the unconscious. More specifically, most mental activities are attributed to the unconscious, involving memory, interest, motivation, and other cognitive processes (Westen 1999: 1062–1063) while volition is often unjustifiably attributed as a sole factor determining the individual’s decision and behaviour, further implying immunity to inadvertency (Jung & von Franz 1964: 22), even though needs, desires, and motives from the unconscious level are considered dominant in behaviour formation (Dichter 1960: 12). Unconsciousness thus affects behaviour by emerging automated mental processes that occur below the level of consciousness and are therefore not accessible to introspection (Kolesarić 2016: 85). Among authors advocating the thesis of dominance of the unconscious over the conscious, Le Bon’s theory differs in origin and applicability of the unconscious.

Several unconscious theories are developed shortly after Le Bon’s theory. Jung differs the individual from the collective unconscious while Freud retains it on the content which one has suppressed throughout his life⁷. Le Bon’s theory of the inher-

⁶ Governing the unconscious is facile since it is common to everyone, while the individual traits of intelligence and reason vanish under the surge of instincts (Le Bon 1899: 148–152).

⁷ Le Bon’s and Freud’s theories are quite similar from the psychological aspect. They share the same object while they only differ in their subject. For Freud, the subject is represented by a lifespan of an individual, whereas for Le Bon it represents a lifespan of a historical race. The object is represented as the unconscious content accumulated and repressed in a lifespan of their subjects.

ited unconscious could be placed exactly in between. Specifically, Jung considers the collective unconscious also as hereditary, but it is common to everyone and exempted from the individual unconscious. Jung seems to share Le Bon's theses; nevertheless, Le Bon specifies his collective unconscious by that what is common to historical race (1896: 60–61). Creation and sustenance of the unconscious proceeds “century-old heredities” that are always dormant, however most accentuated in the crowd and manifested in a form of “savage, destructive instincts left from the primitive ages” (Le Bon 1896: 60–61). Congruence between Le Bon's and other theories of the unconscious is that they stem from repetition and repression of action and the impact on behaviour they generate. But the criteria according to which the content of the unconscious differs among various social groups is what makes Le Bon's unconscious unique. Social groups, referred to as *historical races*⁸, represent a relatively confined community whose culture (tradition, values, rituals, praxis, etc. manifested throughout the history of that group) defined its distinctiveness and imprinted itself into the group's unconscious. Those imprints, whose heredity may resemble a genetic principle, must be considered when analysing the psychological profile of the group in order for oration to invoke the crowd unity. This infers that the inherited unconscious has a substantial role in formation of thought and language that derive from abidingly accumulated culture (Bourdieu 1992: 206). Such reciprocity between the group and its culture shapes cognitive processes and behaviour, thus generating culture and language that are, according to Darwin (Darwin 1981: 53–62), grounded on the principles of instincts deriving from the unconscious (Radick 2002: 10–13). By adopting Darwin's thesis, Le Bon suggests that such manifestations are most perceptible in the crowd.

2.2. REMOTE FACTORS

Le Bon defines the second element of pathos, i.e., the remote factors as:

“those which render crowds capable of adopting certain convictions and absolutely refractory to the acceptance of others. These factors prepare the ground in which are suddenly seen to germinate certain new ideas whose force and consequences are a cause of astonishment, though they are only spontaneous in appearance. The outburst and putting in practice of certain ideas among crowds

⁸ Le Bon (1899: 128) does not refer to the term historical race anthropologically but as races entirely created by the events of history. Such concept is conceivable to Bacon's (2003: 41–46) idols of the tribe that might have helped Le Bon develop his concept of historical race.

present at times a startling suddenness. This is only a superficial effect, behind which must be sought a preliminary and preparatory action of long duration” (1896: 71).

While the inherited unconscious creates mythological foundation (intertwined system of beliefs utilizing archetypal function) that generates ideas of a certain group, remote factors provide context to those ideas. Unconscious segments in remote opinions and beliefs give power to those ideas and as such contribute to formation of ideas on the conscious level, which will eventually (using immediate factors) create the psychological crowd.

To support this theory, Le Bon provides examples from the French revolution, stating the “writings of the philosophers, the exactions of the nobility and the progress of scientific thought” (1896: 72) as remote factors, placing them under the categories of race, tradition, time, institutions, and education.

Historical race, whose “beliefs, institutions and arts (...) are merely the outward expression of its genius” (Le Bon 1896: 73), implies the content that constitutes the race’s pathos. The tradition⁹ is interpreted as conveyed beliefs or behavioural patterns originating from the past, having a symbolic meaning (Allison 1997: 799–801), while also consisting of “the ideas, the needs and the sentiments (...) [that] are synthesis of the race” (Le Bon 1896: 74). Traditions serve as a guide that easily adapts its signifiers (Le Bon 1896: 86) for the needs of various ideologies. Emphasizing the importance of centuries-old influences, rhetoric has to regard remote factors, for any oration that imposes a new idea must consider the time factor, which “accumulates that immense detritus of beliefs and thoughts on which the ideas of a given period spring up” (Le Bon 1896: 77). Ideas are “the daughters of the past and the mothers of the future, but throughout a slaves of time” (Le Bon 1896: 78) that require a “long time to establish themselves, but no less to be eradicated” from the unconscious (Le Bon 1896: 53). Peculiarly, on both the individual and group level, even the most inverse ideas can coexist without any logical interference in their existence (Freud 1949: 18).

Political and social institutions also originate from ideas, sentiments, and customs of a race (Le Bon 1896: 89). Hence, they never diverge from the inherited unconscious, for their racial heredity is their genesis. Lastly, Le Bon’s criticism of former praxis of instructions and education refutes its function of intellectual development while contending its contribution to compliance to authoritarianism. Le Bon (Le Bon 1896: 92–99) illustrates that, as a rule, a student acquires books by heart while neglecting

⁹ Lat. *traditio*; *tradere* - surrender, deliver, handed down (Congar 2004).

his/her personal initiative and judgment, thus blindly complying to what is sometimes the authority and sometimes the authoritarianism of the social hierarchy. Repetition of such praxis predetermines and uniforms an individual for recitation and obedience. Once in the crowd, rational capabilities vanish as a consequence of rhetorical means and contagion, giving place to what repetition integrated into the unconscious, i.e., anticipation and compliance to suggestions of authoritative figures (Le Bon 1896: 99). In such condition, rhetoric based on logic and reason that disposes most authentic knowledge would not activate the crowd, which is why such rhetoric should be based on widespread opinions (Aristotel 1989). Due to disparate character traits of individuals in the crowd, scientific discourse and appeal to reason cannot bring the crowd into the condition described by Le Bon. Hence, the use of poetic expressions, proverbs, dictums, images, and comparisons is what appeals to the spirit and emotions (Škarić 2000: 105). Poetics comprises the capital values of a specific culture and its use appeals to what has been accumulated over time within a social group (Škarić 2000: 106). The orator thereof must be conversant of the racial heredity and remote factors of a certain group, for the most powerful communicative effect is attainable through the use of mental, verbal, graphical, and theatrical tools that work by shaping the group's conversance of the world (Bourdieu 1992: 127).

2.3. *IMMEDIATE FACTORS*

The third element of pathos are immediate factors of the opinions and beliefs of crowds. Immediate factors utilize means whose faculty impresses the psyche previously prepared by the inherited unconscious and remote factors. They can exist in a form of an act that exasperates a group (the resistance of the French court party to insignificant reforms) (Le Bon 1896: 84) which are reinforced with oration and the orator.

If isolated from the inherited unconscious and remote factors, oration does not suffice for activation of the crowd. Oration therefore has to be adjusted according to the listener's opinions, attitudes, and preconceptions (Aristotel 1989), but also consider cultural and racial patterns.

In the conclusion of pathos, the same as for Burke (1969: 41–46), the rhetoric for crowds is dependent on the division of people by their identities, i.e., matching the right expression that reactivates dormant identities without considering ethics but the magic of the words that instigates action. Sociological, psychological, and cultural elements of the identity of historical race, which are common to all group members (Freud 1949: 9), present the basis of rhetorical invention and govern disposition and elocution.

3. ORATOR

Out of the multitude of orator-related characteristics that have been argued historically in rhetorical theory, Le Bon's treatment of a leader, i.e., an orator, can find its traces in several characteristics proposed by both ancient and contemporary rhetoricians. Briefly, what distinguishes the orator in Le Bon's view can be partially found in the Roman fusion of pathos and ethos (Green 2001: 579–580), Augustinian moral character of the orator, i.e., by practicing what one preaches and in contemporary conceptions of charisma (see: Kišiček 2011). Le Bon names Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon as exemplary individuals who qualify according to these criteria.

What further distinguishes Le Bon's treatment of orator is the fact that it proposes criteria of an ideal orator for a specific context, i.e., the phenomenon of the crowd. Unlike more comprehensive treatments of orator represented in classical rhetoric, Le Bon's treatment of orator explicates those aspects that contribute to the activation of the crowd. The preferable orator-related aspects are predominantly represented through their psychological analysis as well as suggested psychological effects they elicit in an individual in the crowd. For Le Bon, an ideal orator for the crowds is comparable to Caesar: "His insignia attracts them, his authority overawes them, and his sword instills them with fear" (Le Bon 1896: 41). Ideally, the orator must distinct himself/herself on a certain subject from the auditory (Le Bon 1896: 146). This is commonly accomplished by authority and credibility (Meyer *et al.* 2008: 232). However, how these are utilized in oration has been vaguely explicated by Le Bon and thus hardly satisfactory for a more thorough rhetorical analysis. For this reason, some of the most applicable forms of their demonstration are derived based on compliancy with the rest of the theses from *The Crowd*.

As for credibility in the context of the crowd, it can be attained only by becoming the apostle of the idea the orator advocates; otherwise, it would lose its persuasiveness (Le Bon 1896: 114). Even the leader was once a follower, until he/she became smitten with the idea, considering everything that opposes it a fallacy and prejudice (Le Bon 1896: 114). Hence, the effect of credibility proceeds from sensation, an intuitive and mental strength, and experiencing the idea as ultimate reality that permeates the leader (Gračanin 1968: 40–42). Governed by sensations and enthrallment of the idea, the orator merges with the oration (Škarić 2000: 27), by which the most persuasive effect is achieved, i.e., by concealing the orator behind the idea he/she communicates (Gračanin 1968: 35–36). From that point, the orator unifies with the oration. By being known for practising what he/she preaches, the orator's credibility

becomes indisputable. In such an instance, as elaborated by Lichtenstein (as cited in Meyer et al. 2008: 41), the oration is overwhelmed with sensory manifestations which are conditioned by sincerity with genuine sentiment that is the outcome of bodily and discursive simulations¹⁰. Once the idea is adopted by the minimum of apostles, the intensity of faith in the idea as well as their authority vests the prestige to the idea (Childers 2014: 81–82).

Qualities that provide a more detailed insight into an ideal orator in *The Crowd* can be found under the sections of leader and prestige. Le Bon acknowledges the plurality of the meanings that undermine any simple definition of the term prestige, but in the context of the crowd, he defines it from the aspect of psychological effects it induces, namely, as “a sort of dominance exercised on our mind by an individual, work or an idea” (Le Bon 1896: 133). As such it „entirely paralyses our critical faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and respect” (Le Bon 1896: 133). Accordingly, it does not surprise that Le Bon finds its utility for his treatment of orator. Although there are many types of such prestige, Le Bon provides two types that enable the orator for eliciting the crowd state.

The first one he terms as acquired or artificial prestige which is akin to similar conceptions that can be found in extensive debates associated with the orator or ethos in rhetorical theory. The second one is termed as personal prestige and accentuates one of the well-established qualities in rhetorical theory that suggests that even “the simplest man, endowed with passions, persuades better than the most eloquent man who lacks it” (La Rochefoucauld 1959: 34).

Acquired prestige is realized through titles, names, property, or reputation and is reliant on the individual’s social position (Le Bon 1896: 123–124). It may also involve symbols of authority just as judges wear robes or wigs, or physicians white coats, or material products such as jewellery, watches, or vehicles that also communicate authority (Cialdini 2005: 188–201). Authority is a mere abstraction if stripped of its symbols (Le Bon 1896: 123–124), while their prominence signifies erudition and social competence – being often considered together with other nonverbal features (Bourdieu 1992: 56). Prestige can also be held by an idea or an object¹¹. Ideas, opinions, intellectual and art works can gain prestige by accumulated repetition

¹⁰ Originally Cicero’s comprehension of eloquence which might reinforce Le Bon’s view on the importance of credibility of apostles.

¹¹ Childers illustrates that “the idea like the right to own guns in the USA, is guaranteed by a sacred text, like the U.S. Constitution, then the assertion can be taken for granted as truth. One is not persuaded by argument; one is persuaded by the prestige of the text” (2014: 83–84).

and through Freudian conception of process of identification¹², their prestige mimics the perfection on the unconscious level and by doing so, it evades rational judgment (Childers 2014: 83–84; Le Bon 1896: 124–125). Otherwise, the discursive display of such prestige by the orator is suggested for provoking the audience's affection (Aristotle 1991) but also helps in maintaining distance from the audience regarding his/her erudition, and by that avoiding everything that might question it (Le Bon 1896: 131).

Le Bon provides extensive descriptions of the importance of acquired qualities possessed by the orator and their psychological effects on the crowd. Although their discursive utilization in an act of oratory remains ambiguous, the mentioning of these qualities can be seen as a tacit advocacy of the Roman conception of prior ethos (Campbell *et al.* 2015: 252–256; Žmavc, 2012). On the other hand, the suggested ideal discursive means in a form of forceful and vigorous affirmations might as well incorporate discursive demonstration of the orator's ethos, thus implying tentative implementation of combination of both prior and discursive ethos suggested by Amossy (2001). It is evident that Le Bon does not suggest that a leader should discursively demonstrate his/her character or personality. The character and personal prestige are predominantly established through performative elements by means of affirmations and repetition. On the other hand, there are no instructions that the discursive representation of character should be omitted from oration. For instance, in occasions where the orator is known to the audience, it suffices to mention one's name in order to invoke the prior ethos as a reminder of the orator's social status previously established in the minds of the audience, while on the other hand, the orator in the context of the crowd might demonstrate one's character discursively in a form of bold affirmations. Yet another possibility is to affirmatively impose one's ethos by identifying the orator with ideas vested with prestige.

Since Le Bon's discursive construction of ethos in *The Crowd* is scarce and due to the lack of explicit references to Roman rhetoricians, the implementation of these perspectives of ethos in Le Bon's rhetorical model remains tentative. It is clear, however, that the acquired qualities of the orator have more effect on the crowd if they are felicitous to the ideas, sentiments, emotions, and beliefs that can be traced for their

¹² According to Freud (1949: 65–66), the unconscious constitutes repressed experiences from various phases of life. All phases are connected through libidinal love that affects conscious behaviour. Libidinal love is situated in unconscious regions of the subject and is directed towards a specific object. When exposed to various stimuli, an individual regressively replaces libidinal connection to the existing object with another object (for instance the orator) because of the perceived similarities between the objects. In the same manner, the oration can regressively activate the individual or racial unconscious (Berger 2011: 23), and revoke reason, henceforth guiding behaviour by instincts (Le Bon 1896: 13).

origin in the remote and immediate factors of the crowd.

Personal prestige significantly differs from the acquired. It is personal, and one possesses it before one actualizes acquired prestige. Le Bon defines it as:

“a faculty independent of all titles, of all authority, and possessed by a small number of persons whom it enables to exercise a veritably magnetic fascination on those around them. They force the acceptance of their ideas and sentiments on those about them, and they are obeyed as is the tamer of wild beasts by the animal that could easily devour him” (Le Bon 1896: 136).

Personal prestige also implies being an apostle and being overwhelmed with the idea whose devotion persuades others. On the other hand, personal prestige has no reliance on social constructs. It can be perceived only outside of them and thus would be more appropriately described as abstruse phenomena. Le Bon augments it with psychology of personal prestige¹³. It is most easily explicated by describing it as a gift of speech, something that the orator radiates, possessed only by him/her, and possession unattainable by profane activities.

The concept of charisma seems to closely correspond to personal prestige, which in antiquity indicated charm, excitement, beauty, pleasure, and seduction (Antonakis et al. 2016: 4) and was described as a divine gift that inspires dedication of others (Stevenson & Lindberg 2010). As such, charisma has been scantily approached from the rhetorical aspect (Perloff 2010: 149), while being more widely represented in other areas that might be associated with Le Bon’s view¹⁴. Similar to Le Bon, Max Weber (Weber 1964: 358–363) discerns institutional charisma (analogous to acquired prestige and symbols of authority) that is secondary and inheritable; and the primary charisma as an emotionally intense force opposing every institutional routine such as traditions and rationality. It represents a metaphysical trait that makes an individual remain in an altered and intensified state of consciousness (Weber 1964: 361). Such a leader adopts the characteristics of Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* whose vividness distinguishes him/her from others¹⁵ and gives him/her innate capacity to strongly

¹³ Le Bon describes personal prestige as a phenomenon that is beyond empirical probability. It is observable only through its manifestations.

¹⁴ Hume, Mill, Nietzsche, Durkheim, and Weber actively addressed psychological and sociological aspects of charisma (Lindholm, 2002) – all whose insignia are visible in Le Bon’s work.

¹⁵ Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* differs from Weber’s and Le Bon’s leader from the sociological perspective. The former is distinguished, isolated or outcasted from others due to his/her superior character (Lindholm 2002: 29–30). His/her vividness makes him/her self-sufficient, while the latter thrives from inseparableness with his/her apostles.

and evocatively communicate the broadest spectrum of emotions (Lindholm 1990: 29–30). Such synchronicity of the orator and oration makes the apostle's soul poetic, consequently affecting and orienting his/her rhetorical expression towards pathos. In such instances, the orator becomes the symbol of the idea he/she advocates. From the perspective of the audience, the orator becomes a signifier for the signified.

Personal prestige is therefore outlined as completely opposite to acquired prestige which is attainable from social structures and the consensus of different segments and institutions of society. As for its application in oratory, personal prestige is predominantly made apparent by its manifestations in the affective relationship between the apostle and the audience (Spencer, 1973: 352). As such it can be classified as another factor that clouds rational appraisal of oration with most of its effect being grounded on pathos (Bourdieu 1992: 129). More precisely, by being predominantly discerned in oratory performance, personal prestige can be recognized in linguistic means suggested by Le Bon such as bold and forceful affirmations and repetition. Hence it is mostly reliant on having despotic intrusiveness (Le Bon 1896: 116). Despotic affirmations and their repetition affirm the orator's authority and his/her veritable apostolate of the idea. An individual in the crowd "loses all force of will, and turns instinctively to the person who possesses the quality they lack" (Le Bon 1896: 119). In line with the other theses proposed by Le Bon, an ideal orator has the structure and performance of an archetypal and mythical hero, whose leadership, exemplary, and willpower are indisputable.

4. ORATION

Those interested in investigating rhetorical instructions suggested by Le Bon will find the discourse-related elements scattered across the entire work. This might make rhetorical reading of *The Crowd* vexatious for any practitioner or tutor of oratory, since any quest that looks for a definite discursive instruction would only affirm that Le Bon's priority was to meticulously analyse psychology of the crowd phenomena and factors that contribute to such a state. Furthermore, due to idiosyncrasy of this model even the derivation of an argument scheme seems questionable. Concurrently, this makes the construction of the implied rhetorical model, predominantly those aspects related to discourse, somewhat challenging and thus imposes a potential for future scholarly treatment.

If the discursive elements found in *The Crowd* were to be approached from a rhetorical perspective, one must first extract and compile all the scattered theses suggested by Le Bon. Subsequently, one ought to make sense of them by arranging them into a meaningful and rhetorically conceivable format. This section strives towards these two aims.

Aggravating factors that probably contributed to the omission of *The Crowd* from the scope of rhetorical theory could be the fact that, besides Herbert Spencer's *Philosophy of Style* (Spencer, 1884), there are no explicit references to any notable works of rhetoric. However, the resemblance between the rhetorical theses from *The Crowd* and some of the elements from the rhetorical works of the British Enlightenment philosophers among others seem quite salient. As it will be presented, the concurrence is most prominent with some of the elements from George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (Campbell 1988). Namely, salient resemblance between the two can be found in pragmatism views on the ends of rhetoric, treatments of men in general and men in particular, the role of images and affirmations as means of persuasion and catalysts of action, empiricist treatment of classes of ideas as well as the principles of their association and how these contribute to transferring energy or vivacity and liveliness, and the role of simple and perspicuous style among others.

Even though the comparison and indication of resemblances between Campbell and Le Bon is not a primary purpose of this paper, it is used to that extent to which it complements and provides more details on relevant aspects of discourse that would round off the suggested rhetorical model since these were apparently not prioritized by Le Bon. Besides Campbell, the review of other relevant rhetorical theories is included.

Additionally, alike authors belonging to the British Enlightenment period, Le Bon excludes disposition (Walzer 2017: 524) though *The Crowd* incorporates some rhetorical tenets that could be attributed to other rhetorical canons. The reason behind omitting schematic arrangement can be associated with the venerable rhetorical maxim never to read or learn the speech by heart in order to be able to vividly unleash its full intensity (Škarić 2000: 26–29). In this regard, Le Bon states that “this necessity of ceaselessly varying one's language in accordance with the effect produced at the moment of speaking deprives from the outset a prepared and studied harangue of all efficaciousness. In such a speech the orator follows his own line of thought, not that of his hearers, and from this fact alone his influence is annihilated” (Le Bon 1896: 114). This notion discards disposition in favour of delivery and places emphasis on the importance of the pragmatism approach to oratory and affective relation that arises between the orator and the audience during a speech.

Since there is a considerable amount of both explicitly and implicitly mentioned rhetorical material in *The Crowd* that relates to discourse, and since it has not been regarded as rhetorically meaningful as presented in its original form, this section presents each of the discourse-relevant elements provided by Le Bon separately, which will then be corroborated with other relevant rhetorical works in order to substantiate

the central thesis of this paper and provide more elaborate and systematic understanding of Le Bon's inadvertent rhetorical model.

In Le Bon's treatment of the crowd, the end motive of the speaker is to instigate or persuade the crowd into the suggested action. By corroborating this with the phenomenological analysis of the crowd, Le Bon narrowed the scope of potential rhetorical and discursive means that ought to be used for such an end. Since Le Bon omits disposition, the sequencing of these discursive elements is done according to their conduciveness and from more general to specific elements.

The primary rhetorical means mentioned explicitly by Le Bon represent the unsparing use of affirmations and repetition. However, *The Crowd* abounds with theses that have been represented by hitherto most prominent rhetoricians in their works and are located aside the chapter that treats discursive means used by leaders of crowds. These include, among others, the extensive use of images, the use of analogical association of ideas, examples, phrases, exaggerations, immediate generalizations, simplistic and perspicuous style, and the omission of any form of demonstration, reasoning, argumentation, or enticing reflection.

4.1. IMAGES AND IMAGINATION

"To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the same time the art of governing them" (Le Bon 1896: 60–61). Since "crowds [are] being only capable of thinking in images, [thus] are only to be impressed by images"¹⁶ (Le Bon 1896: 57), once images have adopted "a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape", they are exhibited as absolute truths (Le Bon 1896: 49) that act as a simulation detaining an individual in vividness of its reality. In such a state, crowds see images one after another, linked without any logical association, making them easily identified with the idea of the speech (Le Bon 1896: 49). When it comes to appealing to imagination, Le Bon suggests that "whatever strikes the imagination of crowds presents itself under the shape of a startling and very clear image, freed from all accessory explanation" (Le Bon 1896: 59). In addition, "it is not then, the facts in themselves that strike the popular imagination, but the way in which they take place and are brought under notice is necessary that by their condensation (...) they should produce a startling image which fills and besets the mind" (Le Bon 1896: 60–61).

¹⁶ Image as the primary function of language has been promoted earlier by Hume, De Richesource, Lamy, etc. suggesting that the most persuasive oration is the one leading towards a simple thought based on the similarities between the image created by expression and the things presented by that image (Meyer *et al.* 2008: 133).

“Only images that terrify or attract them become motives of action” (Le Bon 1896: 57). The latter statement is derived from a more contracted and pragmatic approach used by Le Bon which can be traced for its origin in Campbell’s conclusive inference derived from scrupulous deliberation suggesting that “passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide” (Campbell 1988: 78). For Campbell, one specific type of passions is an intermediary between appeals to imagination and persuasion to action. Some passions indispose the mind for enterprise, some stimulate action, and some are conducive to either (Campbell 1988: 5). This imposes how appeals to imagination ought to be designed. Passions that stimulate action represent “hope, patriotism, ambition, emulation, anger” (Campbell 1988: 5) and are elicited in the following manner:

“The imagination is charmed by a finished picture, wherein even drapery and ornament are not neglected; for here the end is pleasure. Would we penetrate further, and agitate the soul, we must exhibit only some vivid strokes, some expressive features, not decorated as for show (all ostentation being both despicable and hurtful here), but such as appear the natural exposition of those bright and deep impressions, made by the subject upon the speaker’s mind; for here the end is not pleasure, but emotion” (Campbell 1988: 5–6). In summary, passions are “effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object” (Campbell 1988: 78).

However, both Campbell and Le Bon agree that images alone could not compel one into action. “To make me believe it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end” or, more precisely, the orator must first elicit passion ensued by the satisfying “judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites” (Campbell 1988: 77). Passions are achieved through pathetic and action through argumentative discourse, i.e., by “the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits” (Campbell 1988: 77–78). If combined, these two “constitute that vehemence of contention” (Campbell 1988: 78).

4.2. *REASON*

The second pivotal aspect of an individual in the crowd represents one’s intellectual or reasoning capabilities. This directly affects the selection of discursive means because any type of rationalization, argumentation, verification, or determination of origin of inference breaks the sense of unity in the crowd (Le Bon 1896: 71–73). In

case when the truth is impugnable, one good evidence is sufficient to affirm validity of the claim; however, if one is infatuated with passions or interest, appealing to reason will not suffice (Ehninger, 1946: 432–433). “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume 1896: 415), so in order to achieve the full potential of such rhetoric one must never appeal to reason (Le Bon 1896: 109). For crowds, “the feat is never to be achieved by attempting to work upon the intelligence or reasoning faculty, that is to say, by way of demonstration” (Le Bon 1896: 59). Furthermore, “a chain of logical argumentation is totally incomprehensible to crowds, and for this reason it is permissible to say that they do not reason or that they reason falsely and are not to be influenced by reasoning” (Le Bon 1896: 54–55). If the mass were presented with the most exact knowledge, it would not convince it, for such discourse is didactic by its nature (Aristotel 1989), thus requiring mental effort and intellect. Both conforming to the authority and will of the majority contribute to complacency and the feeling of safety which consequently eliminates dubiety, mental processing, and logical assessment of oration (Le Bon 1896: 40). However, such austerity in regard to reasoning capabilities of the crowd is diluted by the notion that “it cannot absolutely be said that crowds do not reason and are not to be influenced by reasoning. The arguments they employ and those which are capable of influencing them are, from a logical point of view, of such an inferior kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning” (Le Bon 1896: 54). This inferior reasoning can be based on the association of ideas that have “only apparent bonds of analogy or succession” or “the association of dissimilar things possessing a merely apparent connection between each other, and the immediate generalization of particular cases” (Le Bon 1896: 54). Such reasoning is conveniently corroborated with the example of “Esquimaux who, knowing from experience that ice, a transparent body, melts in the mouth, concludes that glass, also a transparent body, should also melt in the mouth” (Le Bon 1896: 54).

Since Le Bon distinguishes different kinds of crowds, the tenet that prohibits argumentation or reasoning is relative to the type of the crowd. For criminal juries “it is useless to trouble about any semblance of proof” (Le Bon 1896: 191), whereas for parliamentary assemblies one “should possess a special description of eloquence, composed of energetic affirmations – unburdened with proofs – and impressive images, accompanied by very summary arguments” (Le Bon 1896: 210–211).

Le Bon deprecates reasoning due to weakening of intellectual capabilities of individuals in the crowd, for which purpose any use of argumentative discourse is inadequate (Le Bon 1896: 8). However, Campbell provides an alternate solution for an essentially similar mental state to the one stated by Le Bon. Namely, “when the

hearers are rude and ignorant, nothing more is necessary in the speaker than to inflame their passions. They will not require that the connexion between the conduct he urges and the end proposed be evinced to them. His word will satisfy. And therefore bold affirmations are made to supply the place of reasons. Hence it is that the rabble are ever the prey of quacks and impudent pretenders of every denomination” (Campbell 1988: 78).

4.3. *AFFIRMATIONS*

The advocacy of the use of bold, forceful, and energetic affirmations is explicitly suggested by Le Bon. Authoritative and fierce affirmations have a specific effect if preceded by images. Once such descriptions revoke an ability of reasoning, affirmations are accepted as absolute truths or errors (Le Bon 1896: 58). Affirmations are the backbone of any logical statement (Škarić 2000: 113), however, in rhetoric for the crowds they are used as verified inference without declaring their origin in premises, for their syllogistic exposition incites individual reasoning and thus disintegrates the crowd into its constituting elements, i.e., relatively rational and inferiorly instinctive individuals¹⁷. As such, affirmations are presented as subjective and inductive assertions that do not demonstrate but allege (Škarić 2000: 72). In order to preserve polarized and exaggerated emotions, the orator must use radical affirmations that will eventually compel the crowd into action (Le Bon 1896: 56–57).

4.4. *REPETITION*

Affirmations have to be in accordance with one another, guided with the same idea and in the same direction, and frequently and unanimously repeated. Repetition represents the second pivotal instrument for the orator explicitly mentioned by Le Bon. Repetition in the context of crowds consolidates affirmations as absolute truths and “[embeds them] (...) in those profound regions of our unconscious selves in which the motives of our actions are forged” (Le Bon 1896: 127). In such demagogic rhetoric, where repetition of affirmations leads to the extinction of logical consciousness, makes the sufficiently repeated content an alternative equivalent to truth (Škarić 2000: 96–97).

¹⁷ “Judgments accepted by crowds are merely judgments forced upon them and never judgments adopted after discussion” (Le Bon 1896: 56).

4.5. PARTICULAR DISCURSIVE MEANS

The primary ends of rhetoric for crowds can be summarized in two. The first is to discard individuality and paralyze reasoning capabilities, and the second to incite a crowd into action. The following section attempts to provide an elaborate discursive model for rhetoric for crowds. Among some of the specific means, Le Bon mentions examples, exaggerations, generalizations, polarization, associations, and perspicuous style.

“It is by examples not by arguments that crowds are guided” (Le Bon 1896: 10). In the context of the crowd, examples ought to be used as suggestive means that provide an empirically verified ideal indicating that suggested action, if simulated, can be gratified. For instance, “when it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short space of time, to induce it to commit an act of any nature – to pillage a palace, or to die in defence of a stronghold or a barricade, for instance – the crowd must be acted upon by rapid suggestion, among which example is the most powerful in its effect” (Le Bon 1896: 125). Le Bon also suggests undergone personal experience as another effective instrument (Le Bon: 1896: 110).

Another mode suggests the use of “immediate generalization of particular cases” (Le Bon 1896: 54). Since the feelings in the crowd are highly polarized and exaggerated, it imposes that presentation of suggested ideas is correspondingly polarized. Only as such they can “exercise effective influence on condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape” (Le Bon 1896: 49) since “only images that terrify or attract them [and] become motives of action” (Le Bon 1896: 57). Crowds think exclusively dualistically and know only two extreme polarities: good and evil, black and white, love and hate, which can be further associated with Saussurian binary opposition (Saussure 2011).

The use of improbable things is suggested as one form of exaggeration. Since “crowds, being incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most striking” (Le Bon 1896: 56). As another supplement to startling and clear images can be used a “few marvelous or mysterious facts: examples in point are great victory, a great miracle, a great crime, or a great hope” (Le Bon 1896: 59).

4.5.1. DISCOURSE FOR IMAGINATION

In order to incite passions by images, the orator must find ways of providing vivacity and energy similar to those possessed by sense experiences and memory. This effort is

otherwise known in rhetorical circles as *enargeia* and is also found in Campbell and applied by Le Bon in the context of the crowd oratory. It implies the use of evocative expression that “can raise the ideas of the imagination to almost the same vividness of sense impressions” (Bormann 1977: 156)¹⁸ and as such serve to re-experience the expression (Patton 1975: 29). In a more general sense, Campbell suggests that “the principal delight to the imagination, is the exhibition of a strong likeness, which escapes the notice of the generality of people” (Campbell 1988: 74–75). In a more particular context such as the crowds, the analogical bonds between the compared entities are even less prioritized. It suffices to present only the most apparent congruity such as in Le Bon’s example of Esquimaux. This infers, as Campbell suggests, that comparison is at the heart of any appeal to imagination as well as tropes and figures that emanate from it (Campbell 1988: 74–75).

Le Bon does not mention tropes and figures in particular, but if rhetorical theory were to be consulted, their applicability for such rhetoric could be justified if aligned in accordance with the other criteria suggested by Le Bon.

Applicability of tropes and figures is considered for their perlocutionary effect with the focus on cognitive, imaginative, emotional, and volitional aspects. This makes some of the classical as well as contemporary treatments of tropes and figures relatively applicable for such rhetoric. The cognitive approach in a form of conceptual theory of metaphors holds that “the locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another” (Lakoff 1993: 203). This further assumes that metaphors can be understood as “a conceptual tool for structuring, restructuring and even creating reality” (Kövecses 2020: 1). By re-creating what is stated, the focus is placed on imagination where simulation has a central role through “mental enactment of the very action referred to in the metaphor” (Gibbs & Matlock 2008: 162). Both imagination and mental enactment represent a common ground where rhetoric for crowds and conceptual metaphor theory seem complementary.

Tropes and figures in general can have the capacity of evoking the subconscious by animating the expression due to their simplifying, depictive, and augmentative effect (Benčić 1995: 190; Lanham 1991; Škarić 2000: 64–65). Some perlocutionary features of tropes and figures represent their affective and suggestive nature (Weststeijn 1995: 117). They also tend to generalize, accentuate, and simplify that eventually weakened logical inference (Charteris-Black 2011: 323; Gibbs & Tendahl 2006: 399–400; Lakoff

¹⁸ Hume regards rhetoric as an art form that attains its full potential if it incites passions by appealing to imagination, not reason (Patton 1975: 29). Such conception was shared by Le Bon in terms of importance of such expression when appealing to crowds (Le Bon 1986: 40).

& Johnson 2015: 35–38), but as well vitalize (Shopenhauer 2002: 32–33) and invoke excitement (Anderson 1964: 60). All of these features represent metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, thus making them congruous to rhetoric for crowds. Furthermore, parable, epithets, hyperbole, emphasis, epitrochasm, and catachresis simplify and amplify expression, and thus facilitate visualization and polarization of emotions. Hence, some tropes and figures have to primarily serve the purpose of the mentioned criteria, such as generalization, exaggeration, simplification, polarization, or by taking place of signifiers of lesser vivacity. As such they can be utilized in rhetoric for crowds.

4.5.2. ARGUMENTS FROM ANALOGY

Comparison opens another consideration that addresses the potential schemes of discourse.

It makes one out of two indicators that suggest the potential of rhetoric for crowds having elements that could be classified as arguments. The second indicator is represented in several examples originally intended to demonstrate inferior reasoning of crowds provided by Le Bon. These two indicators might present material that could be affiliated to the vibrant field of argumentation theory even though Le Bon approves of the use of arguments only in particular instances and in a very distinctive manner.

Whereas most of the argumentation serves the purpose of reasoning and predominantly has an epistemic function, in the case of crowds, reasoning is something that needs to be avoided. Even though reasoning and argumentation are commonly in very close correlation, they do not represent identical concepts (Rowland 1987: 149–150; Walton 1990). This makes it feasible to use argumentation theory for deriving the assumed argument structure applicable to rhetoric for crowds.

Argumentation theory provides several types of arguments that are relatively applicable to the context of crowds due to some of their debated functions. Based on the resembling views that Campbell and Le Bon have on associations of ideas, it is assumed that Le Bon, like Campbell, suggests the argument structures that integrate comparison (Bizzell 2010). The argument type that is most plausible represents the argument from analogy, whereas arguments from similarity (Pepper 1927) or generalization (Brockhaus & Hochberg 1975) are more tentative. For Campbell, the most effective comparison intended for imagination has “strong likeness which escapes the notice of the generality of people” (Campbell 1988: 74), whereas in the crowds the most dissimilar ideas can be associated while having the bare minimum of qualitative similarity (Le Bon 1896: 54). Moreover, this example indicates that it is both weak relations between two entities and them having only one shared property or attribute

sufficient to support substantial forceful affirmations. This qualifies such arguments as figurative (Brown 1989) or predictive analogies (Juthe 2005: 6–7).

These relate to argumentation from analogy in several intriguing aspects. Whereas reasoning is one common priority and criterion for an effective argument in logic, Le Bon, similarly to Campbell, utilizes arguments from analogy for their illustrating potential (Campbell 1988: 74). Emphasis is not placed on the necessary resemblance between relations and properties of proportions, which otherwise represents the impetus of scholarly debates for logicians and philosophers. It can thus be argued that this application sheds a different perspective on the ends of such an argument. To the relative extent, the arguments from analogy that have weak rational warrant and reasoning force are predominantly appropriate for crowds (McKay 1997: 94; Waller 2001: 212; Walton *et al.* 2008: 43–44). McKay refers to Sidgwick's claim that arguments from analogy are not demonstrative (McKay 1997: 96), whereas Waller reminds that figurative "analogies never prove anything" (Waller 2001: 200), which is particularly felicitous for crowds.

By the use of analogies and comparisons, the priority is placed on giving appearance of arguing while not having the effect elicited by traditional argumentation (Blair 2020: 4).

4.5.3. ARGUMENTS FROM ENTHYMEMES

Enthymeme is not unadulterated affirmation but is, nonetheless, applicable in rhetoric for crowds. Even though it classifies as logical modality, it minimizes the effort of rational evaluation and can both corroborate the concluding statement or diverge redundant thoughts (Walker 1994). Some forms of enthymemes found in *The Crowd* represent analogies, comparisons, and examples which present the subjective type of evidences (Le Bon 1896: 129). They are easily accepted because they do not indicate the argumentation process but still possess a powerful inductive and seductive effect (Škarić 2000: 72). In most cases, enthymemes should be positioned as far apart from each other (Shopenhauer 2002: 27) and derived from accumulated and generally accepted attitudes and opinions, for as such they do not require logical processing (Aristotel 1989). By not expressing one of the premises, the enthymeme does not provide the origin of the conclusion and thus might evade rational evaluation. In such manner, the crowd is not able to perceive paradox of the affirmation if one or more premises are fallacious. As such the enthymeme becomes ostensible, making it look like a verified statement. Since fallacious premises remain concealed, it has the potential to evade reason and thusly removes everything that might be the subject of inquiry (Meyer *et al.* 2008: 228). Once the enthymeme has taken an axiomatic form, it gains authority and implies its acknowledgement of others (Aristotel 1989).

4.5.4. STYLE – SIMPLICITY AND PERSPICUITY

Perspicuous and comprehensible expression is essential when engaging pathos (Campbell 1988; Ehninger 1946: xlv). Le Bon shares H. Spencer's proposition of the use of brevity and succinct expressions in order to spare the mental effort of the listener, thus allowing the expression to be conceived with its full vividness and imaginative potential (Spencer 1884: 10–16). Such a style perpetuates consistently through rhetoric for crowds. Le Bon applies it to both images and affirmations. It ensouls linguistic means that fully evoke the vivid capacity of images, which are hence directed with literate and despotic affirmations, both complying to the simplistic precept for style. In that order, images paralyze the reason, and in such a state, affirmations are easily accepted and averted from their inquisition. Hereto, a perspicuous style assumes elimination of dubiety and uncertainty of the advocated idea (Meyer *et al.* 2008: 247), making the nature of such oration apodictic — it does not raise questions.

4.5.5. MYTHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

Le Bon has never mentioned disposition *per se*; however, his conception of disposition is perceptible in the utilization of mythological structure settled in the inherited unconscious. Acceptance of new ideas is facilitated if they are presented in a familiar structure. Hence, the usage of frequently used linguistic structures can have the capacity for evoking the feeling of certainty in the suggested outcome. Some of those structures are the structures of myths, the medium commonly used to prevent oblivion and preserve tradition that hindered primitive thoughts and behaviours from their recurrence (Foucault 2015: 182–183). Myths, however, predominantly operate on the mental level and much less on the linguistic one (Charteris-Black 2011: 23–24). On the psychological level, myth is a mental image of a much broader scope that controls and gives philosophical meaning to daily life. Their connection to everyday activities is realized on the unconscious level (Berger 2011: 162) from which their semantics originates. In the context of this rhetorical model, myths can be seen as inhabiting and acting from the hereditary unconscious of a *historical race* (Le Bon 1896: 187) in the form of symbols¹⁹, events, or narratives and stories of certain groups that coverts them and thus represses them from the conscious level (Berger 2011: 163). Myths on the

¹⁹ Symbols signify objects according to cultural convention, possessing no similarities between the signifier and the signified (Short 2007: 220). The unbound relation between the signifier and the signified is what makes mythological structure so effective, for the structure of the signified remains while signifiers are easily adapted to current ideologies.

psychological level may resemble Jungian archetypes²⁰, for they enable induction of unconscious instincts, sentiments, and passions over reason.

Mythological structure functions by adapting the original subject and object inhered in an original myth to current discourse and resembling signifiers of ideology. It implicitly addresses the unconscious and thereby evokes excitement and feelings usually evoked by the myth (Charteris-Black 2011: 320). Explicit denotation of the myth's original signifiers is irrelevant for oration, but their implicit meaning, its attributes, characteristics, connotations, and their interrelation have a primary effect. Oration thus refers to the original myth metaphorically. It uses explicit signifiers of current ideology and gives them the signification of those found in the original myth. Syntax, plot, and denouement are structured according to the scheme and semantics of the original myth that is easily accepted due to its historical presence in the inherited unconscious of the group²¹.

5. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to present the arguments that advocate the placement of Le Bon's work *The Crowd* in the field of rhetoric. The presented arguments include analysis of the impact of *The Crowd* on the 20th century communication and presentation of the rhetorically relevant theses found in *The Crowd*. To extend the support for the hypothesis, the latter were compared and corroborated with the complementary findings from both classical and contemporary rhetorical theory. Due to extensiveness of the field of rhetorical theory, this effort by no means represents a definite or conclusive work and as such it is open for debate and additional scholarly treatment. Even though Le Bon is commonly classified as a social psychologist, which is particularly notable in *The Crowd*, further analyses of this work from a rhetorical perspective could potentially affirm the grounding elements for assuming Le Bon as a pioneer of what could be termed as phenomenological rhetorical invention. Hence, from a rhetorical perspective, *The Crowd* can be feasibly considered as an aggregate integrating some of the prominent rhetorical theories that finds empirical support in the crowd phenomenology, which was even more promoted as such due to its association with some of the significant events in the 20th century.

²⁰ Jung's notion of archetypes resembles the myths of historical race in their characterization as inherited patterns actualized in the conscious state in a form of images by which they affect the behaviour (Jung 1980: 4-9).

²¹ Bourdieu (1992: 202-207; Verdes-Leroux 2001: 255-256) and Hughes (as cited in Cottle 2009: 141-146) suggest the use of mythological structure in various types of communications.

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ABSTRACT

Psihologija gomila Gustava Le Bona jedno je od značajnijih djela o masovnoj psihologiji. To djelo se, osim u psihološkom, nerijetko spominje i u kontekstu doprinosa koji je imalo za razvoj nekih komunikacijskih praksi tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća. Premda se u njemu prvenstveno i detaljno razrađuju podrijetlo i psihološke karakteristike gomile, u ovom radu iznose se argumenti koji sugeriraju kako taj psihološki diskurs, između ostalog, ima za svrhu i definiranje retoričkog modela kao jednog od čimbenika smišljenog poticanja ponašanja gomile. Ovaj rad, pisan s retoričkog gledišta, iznosi Le Bonove smjernice relevantne za masovno govorništvo. U svrhu što preciznijeg uviđanja i razrade povezanosti *Psihologije gomila* s retorikom, navedene smjernice potkrijepljene su relevantnom retoričkom teorijom. Tako će se pokazati da u učestalom korištenju određenih instanci retoričkih koncepata patosa, govornika, govora i *kairosa* Le Bon vidi esencijalna sredstva za povezivanje pojedinaca u gomilu kao i za njezino naknadno usmjeravanje. Takav interdisciplinarni retorički model zahvaća u različite znanstvene discipline poput lingvistike, retorike, komunikologije, odnosa s javnošću te u njihove poddiscipline. Izlažući eksplicitne i implicitne retoričke smjernice iz *Psihologije gomila*, ovaj rad sugerira kako je Le Bonov znanstveni doprinos bio ne samo psihološki nego i retorički, te da zaslužuje biti uvršten i u povijest retorike.

KEYWORDS:

gomila, nesvjesno, prestiž, retorika, slikovitost