

HAD AN OTTOMAN COMBATANT ANY CHANCE TO
WIN THE LOVE OF THE DAUGHTER OF THE RECTOR OF THE
DALMATIAN TOWN ZADAR ?

(Islam in Ottoman Dalmatia in the 16th and 17th century and its
coexistence with the Christian world of neighboring Venetian
Dalmatia)

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According to a firsthand diary notice written by an unknown eye-witness - on 23 October 1571 during the dramatic Cyprus war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, six Ottoman cavalymen appeared in front of the walls of the besieged Dalmatian town Zadar and challenged the same number of Venetian combatants to a duel.¹ The dwellers of Zadar did not want to miss a tournament so they climbed up to the walls of the town, covering even the roofs of the houses above the fighters. Unfortunately, the unknown eye-witness did not describe the duel in detail, noting only that two of the combatants were slightly injured. However, he did mention that after the duel one of the Ottoman participants unsuccessfully asked the rector of Zadar if he could enter the town. He begged to be allowed to visit the churches of Zadar and attend mass, but there was a rumor in the town that he had fallen in love with the rector's daughter. Whether his motive was love for the rector's daughter, whom he had met once before the war, or a visit to the churches of Zadar, the diarist could not answer. Had an Ottoman combatant any chance to win the love of the rector's daughter?

At the same time, the coastal town of Šibenik faced another problem. Pračat, the warlike *sancak-bej* and the military commander-in-chief of the Ottoman administrative unit *sancak* Klis, prejudiced the post-war situation on the Venetian-Ottoman border by drawing on the map of the Šibenik municipality a red line

¹ V. SOLITRO, 1989, 1897.

separating this Venetian town and the Ottoman territories in the hinterland of Šibenik.² According to this line the Šibenik municipality was squeezed into a shallow coastal belt and divided from the tens of neighboring villages, excluding only the 14 villages located in the vicinity of the town walls. Was the red line between the two worlds, states, religions and economies drawn by Perčat-bej on the map of Šibenik impenetrable?

As far as trade was concerned the opposite was true. In 1580, the Venetian office *Magistrato dei Cinque Savii all Mercanzia* accepted the activity of a Jew from Split, Daniele Rodrigo who tried to make this Venetian town an international port of trade between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. One Venetian account from 1590 pointed out that the amount of trade running through Split attracted tradesmen from India, Persia, and Armenia, and represented the "golden ring" between the Orient and Venice. Moreover, in 1626, the amount of trade in Split reached 25% of that done in the port of Venice due to the fact that 2/3 of Balkan trade ran through this port.³ This is why the rector Leonardo Bollani on 3 April 1600, briefed the Venetian government on the significance of trade dynamism in these words: "Your town of Split is in very good condition, enjoying under your sovereignty the two most important things: abundance in living standard and peace on the border."⁴

Was this border impassable in terms of religion?

During the Cyprus war, on 27 August 1571 a citizen of Venetian Split, Petar Bačić, fled with his mother the besieged Venetian town of Split and joined the Ottomans in neighboring Klis.⁵ He was annoyed by a sentence of the town court which gave some of his dead father's land to the noble Alberti family. Moreover he was devastated and almost killed by Luka Alberi's rejection of his proposal to marry his daughter Jelena. Petar was welcomed into Muslim ranks and took part in plundering the hinterland of his native town. However, in a skirmish on the Venetian side he met his former girl-friend's brother. Petar noticed Jelena's belt on the young boy. He was broke-down and decided to save the youngster's life. Moreover, a few days later under cover of a storm he secretly left Klis with his mother and returned to Split. He repented before the rector and the town authority and was accepted into community again. Was his repentant cry accepted because of an aversion toward Islam or rather because of the dramatic situation in which the besieged town needed all soldiers? Probably both. In writing this story like the biblical parable of the lost son, the Venetian rector of Split used it as effective ideological fuel for the citizens of the besieged town.

Stories such as this were not rare in early modern Dalmatian history. From the mid 15th century, after overrunning Bosnia (1463), the Osmanli Turks had threatened Venetian sovereignty in neighboring Dalmatia, moving their border from the Balkans into the narrow and shallow Adriatic coast belt of the Dalmatian district. However, despite five wars in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries (the war of 1499-1502, the Holy League war of 1537-40, the Cyprus war of 1570-

² Ibid, 211.

³ See R. PACI, 1971, 94-95

⁴ *Commissiones et relatioens venetae* (= CRV,) vol. (48) V, 300.

⁵ V. SOLITRO, 1989, 168.

73, the Candian war of 1645-1669 and the Wiener war of 1683-1699) between the Venetians and the Turks, there was broad coexistence and cooperation between Ottoman and Venetian Dalmatia which included both trade and personal relationships. Their relationship varied from cruel hostilities during the wars and Ottoman raids to the outstanding example of mutual cooperation in the Asia-European trade through the Dalmatian town of Split.

According to F. Braudel, on the religious level the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Venice was largely a one-way road with many conversions to Islam and few in the other direction. Was this the case in Dalmatia as well?

The historiographical background of Islamization as well as coexistence in Dalmatia

The Ottoman soldier's love for the rector's daughter is only a paradigm for the process of Islamization as well as for the coexistence between the two religious worlds in Dalmatia. This religious, cultural and historiographical phenomenon has been neglected in former Yugoslav and world historiography as far as Dalmatia is concerned mostly due to the focus of attention upon Bosnia and Hercegovina. There are two main reasons for this. Bosnia and Hercegovina is a profoundly Islamized country and was the source for the Islamization of the western part of former Yugoslavia such as the Croatian provinces of Dalmatia and Slavonia. In addition to this, in contrast to a strong Muslim majority in Bosnia from the very beginning of the Ottoman rule there, after the Venetian victory and assertion of authority over Ottoman Dalmatia in the late 17th century, all of the Muslims fled to neighboring Bosnia and none remained in Dalmatia.

As far as the problem of coexistence is concerned, there are several studies concerning the trade relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Venice.⁶ However there is no study of cultural and religious coexistence between the two political and religious worlds.

There is no study of the Islamization of Dalmatia either. Fortunately, as far as the problem of Islamization in Bosnia is concerned there is an abundant historiographical tradition. There are basically four historiographical camps which can be classed mainly according to their perception of the two most important topics: the pace of conversion into Islam and the origins of its converts.

One of the camps which mainly consist of Bosnian historians (A. Aličić, N. Filipović, H. Šabanović)⁷ has stressed that Islamization occurred overwhelmingly among members of the Bosnian church as a reaction against the persecution declared by the Pope who conditioned his help to Bosnian kings against the Turks by demanding the persecution of the Bosnian church. According to these scholars, Islam speedily won over the majority of the Bosnian church members who were willing to submit themselves to the economic and political protection of *Pax Ottomana*.

⁶ The most representative are: R. PACI, 1971; M. S. TRALJIĆ, 1959; G. NOVAK, 1921.

⁷ Studies by N. FILIPOVIĆ, 1970, 141-67; N. FILIPOVIĆ, 1973; H. ŠABANOVIĆ, 1982; A. ALIČIĆ, 1985, are characteristic.

From the historiographical perspective of Croatian scholars (D. Mandić, F. Rački, J. Erceg) Islamization occurred in a long time span because of Ottoman pressure against the Catholic wavering believers in Bosnia who outnumbered both the members of the Bosnian church as well as the population of the Orthodox Vlachs and Serbs by almost ten times.⁸

Serbian scholars (S. Stanojević, K. Milas)⁹ have neglected the problem of Islamization. They point out the importance of the new Orthodox Vlach population settled by the Ottomans along the neighboring fringe of Bosnia and Dalmatia as auxiliary military troops against Habsburg Croatia and Venetian Dalmatia. They argue that, because Vlachs were guaranteed rights within the *millet* system they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and did not need to accept Islam in order to enjoy upward mobility.

Recent summary studies by world scholars (N. Malcolm, M. Pinson, J. V. A. Fine)¹⁰ inspired a great deal by the ongoing war tragedy of the present day, claim that Islamization in Bosnia was a long term and multiethnic process which won converts among all church communities in Bosnia. They reject the idea of the massive forcible conversion of Bosnians in the early years after the conquest as false, pointing out the slow pace of conversion spanning many generations.¹¹

The lack of translations of land registers (*defters*), the most important primary source for the study of Islamization in Dalmatia, is the main reason why these scholars have neglected this process in the history of Dalmatia. However, a scholar from Sarajevo, F. Spaho started to issue land registers in the journal *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae*, which provides us with detailed name lists of the population (all households and men capable of work) and all sources of feudal income in the territory - personal feudal taxes of the subject population in some *nahiyas* of the part of Dalmatia under Ottoman control. These *defters* recorded property-ownership and categorized people by their religion. The author translated from Turkish into Croatian a part of the Turkish land register for the *Sancak* of Bosnia from 1528 and 1550 pertaining to the Petrovo polje i gora and Zminje polje *nahiyas*¹² as well as that from 1574 pertaining to the Skradin *nahiya*.¹³ The same was the case with the translation of the Turkish land register for the *Sancak* of Klis from 1604 pertaining to the Sinj and Vrlika *nahiyas*.¹⁴

Despite his initial historiographical effort, neither F. Spaho nor any other scholar goes further in their analysis of these *defters*, nor do they provide a broader understanding of the Islamization process in Dalmatia.

This would be a worthwhile effort because an explanation of the widespread coexistence in Dalmatia can be included in the broad mosaic of coexistence between Islam and Christianity within the Mediterranean basin from Spain to Egypt in the 16th and 17th centuries.

⁸ D. MANDIĆ, 1967; D. MANDIĆ, 1964, 362-93. F. RAČKI, 1931; J. ERCEG, 1989.

⁹ See for further references in G. STANOJEVIĆ, 1970; N. MILAS, 1989.

¹⁰ M. NOEL, 1994; J. FINE, 1987; M. PINSON, 1994.

¹¹ M. NOEL, 1994, 54.

¹² F. SPAHO, 1986, 47-86.

¹³ F. SPAHO, 1989, 79-107.

¹⁴ F. SPAHO, 1985, 21-120.

Islamization in Dalmatia - roots and development

Cristofor Mauro's *ducale* to all rectors in Istria, Dalmatia and Albania dated 26 February 1471 forbade the acceptance of Franciscans from Bosnia, and had one of them expelled. Similar orders followed in 1573 and 1575.¹⁵ What did the Franciscans from Bosnia do in Dalmatian monasteries? What changed in Bosnia?

The Ottoman conquest of the Balkans included a wave of "ethnic cyclones", which further complicated the existing natural settlement.¹⁶ At the time of the conquest there was a large-scale out-migration of Catholics who fled to the still unconquered region of Bosnia or to neighboring Croatia and Dalmatia. They vacated lands, which were settled partly by Muslims, but also by Orthodox Serbs who had started fleeing into Bosnia and Dalmatia in the decades of Ottoman pressure on Serbia.¹⁷

The Ottomans apparently did not promote Islam by forcible means. However, economic and political advantages to be gained by joining the state religion were sufficiently compelling. The profession of Islam enabled the feudal lords to enter into the new elite: personal accounts were exempted from the special pool tax (*cizye*).¹⁸

Slowly but steadily the overwhelming part of the Bosnian population accepted Islam, especially the population in the fertile region along the river. This part of the population remained static, pursuing agriculture.

The Turks were particularly eager for the return of order in the strategic areas close to the Habsburg and Venetian frontier. They found their most reliable settler material in the Orthodox Balkan Vlachs, the descendants of hinterland Romans who survived the sixth - and seventh - century Slavic onslaught by retreating to the peninsula's high mountain passes.¹⁹ The Vlachs were particularly suitable for the Ottoman government's purposes, not only because they were mobile (their typical occupations were sheepherding, horse-breeding and organizing transport for traders), but also because they had a strong military tradition. They had been members of the Orthodox Church for long time and they established the Orthodox presence in that part of Bosnia. Although they received no military salary, they were entitled to carry arms and expected to fulfill a military role; in place of a salary, they were permitted to plunder enemy territory.²⁰

Their settlement in Dalmatia occurred in waves but basically after the assertion of Ottoman sovereignty in these territories. On 26 February 1531 the

¹⁵ Povijesni arhiv u Zadru (= PAZd), *Inventar pergamena samostana sv. Frane*, 142, I, 31; I, 34.

¹⁶ According to I. BANAC, 1992, 40, the most of the Muslims in the Ottoman Balkans were transplanted Anatolians to be deported (*sürgim*) and colonized Turkoman nomads (*yödrük*).

¹⁷ M. PINSON, 1994, 14.

¹⁸ I. BANAC, 1992, 41.

¹⁹ I. BANAC, 1992, 42.

²⁰ M. Noel claims that Vlachs have an Albanian background. According to him "Most of the Romanized and Latin-speaking population of this area (whose version of Latin was influenced by their own earlier language, Illyrian) was dispersed, destroyed or assimilated by the invasions of the dark ages, especially those of the Slavs. A remnant which practised pastoralism was able to survive in the mountains, unaffected by the Slavs' takeover of settled agriculture..." (M. NOEL, 1994, 73).

Venetian syndic Andrea Barbarigo spoke in the Senate about Vlach movement during 1523-27, mentioning that "*più miglia*" Serbian families settled in Dalmatia.²¹ Moreover, the proveditor-general of Dalmatia and Albania briefed the Venetian government about Orthodox priests coming with the population.²² In 1551 the Habsburg general Ivan Lenković informed king Ferdinand that the Ottomans had drawn several thousands of Vlachs from the inner Empire and settled them in Dalmatia - around the Kosovo valley near Knin.²³ Ottoman *defsters* from 1540, 1550, 1574 and 1604 confirm the existence of Orthodox monasteries in Dalmatia; Dragović, Krupa and Krka most probably were founded at the beginning of the 16th century.²⁴ Although *millet* regulations, strictly forbade the building of new churches within the Empire, the Ottomans turned a the blind eye as far as new Orthodox churches were concerned. From 1523 to 1537 several new Orthodox churches were founded by repairing old and vacated Catholic churches. This is why the *Grande consilio* in neighboring Venetian Zadar complained on 2 February 1546 that churches on the Ottoman territories were in "*miseria*" because of "... *esser ocupati da forestieri, et persone estranee....*".²⁵

As far as the relationships between the Vlach newcomers and the Ottoman authorities in Dalmatia were concerned, from the very beginning of their settlement in Dalmatia the Ottomans tried to cripple the Vlach privileged *filuri* status according to which each Vlach household was obliged to pay one Ottoman golden ducat yearly and participate in the Ottoman military service. The Ottomans tried to bind the Vlachs to the land and make them pay taxes including tithes. Thus, according to defster from 1528 the population of Vlachs from *nahiyas* Petrovo polje i gora and Zminje polje was forced to pay personal taxes as well as tithes. However, these efforts spurred Vlach dissatisfaction, causing them to leave Ottoman territory and settle in Habsburg Croatia. According to *defsters* from 1550 the Vlachs population in Dalmatia was granted *filuri* status by the Ottomans again. In spite of Ottoman wishes to attach this population to agriculture, the Vlach population rejected the pressure because *filuri* status allowed them less taxes and more mobility. This is why Islamization among the Vlach population failed. In Petrovo polje i gora *nahiya* in 1528 there were only 5 Islamized Vlach families out of 239 and in 1550 only 20 out of 295 in total. There was a similar ratio in the neighboring *nahiya* Zminje polje (Chart 1).

The Ottomans also faced the problem of mountainous tribes (*jörüks*) in Anatolia. However in Anatolia the Ottomans forcibly drew *jörüks* into the Ottoman agricultural system forcing them to work in the mines and fields, or just settled them in Cyprus. The Balkans were different. The numbers of Vlachs were a threat to the state and Ottomans did not dare to adapt a forcible policy toward them. Rather they relied on cooperation. It was a striking paradox that by using the Vlach clement in overrunning the Balkans the Ottomans became their prisoner.

²¹ PAZD, *Nakičeničeva kronika*, 121.


²² Ibid.

²³ D. ROKSANDIĆ, 1991, 33.

²⁴ The Christians were only allowed to repair delapidated churches. See B. NILEVIĆ, 1987, 212.

²⁵ Znanstvena knjižnica u Zadru, *Libri Consiliorum*, III, 2, 2, 1546.

Chart 1 - The number of Christian and Muslim households in the two nahiyas of Dalmatia, Source: F. Spaho, "Splitsko zaleđe...", Acta historico-oeconomica..., vol. 13, pp. 47-86.



In spite of the spread of Islam, Catholicism continued to exist both in Bosnia and Dalmatia under Ottoman control. The Catholic Church was regarded with deep suspicion although Mehmed II granted it in 1463 by *Adhnama* the essential legal status necessary to continue its activities. Catholics looked outside toward the Pope as their leader, which made them suspicious to the Ottomans and thus victims of persecution. By and large, faced with increasing numbers of raids and skirmishes at the beginning of the 16th century, the Catholic church organization almost disappeared in the Dalmatian part under Ottoman control. Franciscan monasteries, a stronghold of the Catholic church organization in this part of Dalmatia, were devastated. After the Cyprus war 1570-73 there was no church in the large Radobilja parish. This is why the papal visitor August Valero allowed the priest of Radobilja Petar Stojdražić to hold mass, deliver sacraments and other rituals either in his house or in some other distinct place. Despite the fact that in the second part of the 16th century and at the beginning of the 17th century the situation changed for the better, the bishops from Venetian Split wrote to *The Congregation of Propaganda* in Rome about the great misery in the churches under Ottoman control. They also mentioned that many Orthodox newcomers settled in vacant villages and mixed with Catholics.²⁶

In the circumstances of an overwhelming majority of Christians on the neighboring Bosnian border toward Venice the Ottomans tried to stir up a process of Islamization, especially on the fringe of the Empire.

²⁶ However at the beginning of the 17th century the Ottoman authorities became indulgent to Catholic church. Ponzon was first bishop who crossed the border and visited some churches on the Ottoman territories. See S. KOVAČIĆ, 1989, 156-157.

The first Muslim elements in Dalmatia were soldiers in the Dalmatian garrisons, land-lords or administrators. According to a document of the Bosnian cavalry probably headed to Hungary in 1526 there were 226 men under the label of Croat out of 3.116 drafters. A. Aličić claims that these *spahis* were settled and had their property on Dalmatian territory under Ottoman control. There is a solid basis for this theory because the territorial gains in this Dalmatian territory were called initially *vilayet* Croats.²⁷ There were also 971 soldiers labeled as Bosniaks and 100 under different labels such as Arab (4), Arnaut (29), Berane (5), Avlona (1), Edrine (1), Filibe (8), Anatolia (21), Vidin (2), Karaman (2), Istanbul (1), Ungurus (9), Siraz (3) and so forth. There were 1.779 cavalymen without origins. The international composition of the army bears witness to the mixed soldier population with an overwhelmingly majority of Bosnians.

Was the origin of these cavalymen (*spahis*), labeled as Croats, Christian and Slavic, or were they labeled such just because they had land in the part of Dalmatia which used to be part of the Croatian state during the middle ages and at the eve of the Ottoman attack? Due to a lack of sources the question is not simple to answer. However, V. Čubrilović noted that a minority of the old Bosnian landholders did become *spahis* and retain some of their estates; but, as he also noted, it was not necessary for them to become Muslims in order to do so.²⁸

Was Venetian Dalmatia the source for spreading Islamization in the Ottoman part of Dalmatia? If so, to what extent?

On 8 April 1574 the Venetian rector from Split informed the Venetian government that he had been investigating the case of a Dalmatian girl from Vranjic who fell in love with an Ottoman soldier from Klis. They met each other in her house in Vranjic where the Ottoman stopped by. He asked for water but she offered him wine. The rector tried to keep hidden this case from her father and brother. They might have either sent her into a monastery or might even have had her killed. Why was the Venetian rector so concerned with love affairs between a Split citizen and an Ottoman soldier? According to his account, sent to the Venetian government, there were many precedents, and some Catholic girls had fled to the Ottoman side.

On 1 June 1560 the beg of Bosnian *sancak* sent a letter to the Sublime Porte noticing that the famous officer Ivan from Venetian Šibenik had escaped to the Ottoman side and deliberately accepted Islam. The Sublime Porte granted Ivan with a large land estate in Ottoman territory in Dalmatia.

Was acceptance of Islam always deliberate? According to S. Traljić in 1506 there was a Tomas Turk settled in Venetian Zadar.²⁹ In the census of Zadar city dwellers from 1527 there were surnames such as Turčin, Turkinja, Turčinović. One can ask whether they got these surnames as converts to Christianity from Islam or rather as freed slaves from Ottoman captivity?

Slavery was an important social-economic factor contributing to the spread of Islam in Bosnia and Dalmatia. The taking of slaves in war - soldiers as well as civilians - was standard Ottoman practice. Large numbers of slaves were seized by

²⁷ A. ALIČIĆ, 1977, 171-177.

²⁸ M. NOEL, 1994, 64.

²⁹ M. S. TRALJIĆ, 1959, 208.

the the Turks in their campaigns against the Habsburg Croats and Venetian Dalmatians. Although the overwhelmingly majority of slaves on the Sarajevo slave market had their origin in the Croatian province of Slavonia, there are a few references to slaves from Dalmatia.³⁰ In the *kanun-nama* for the Bosnian and Klis *sancaks* from 1565 and 1574 respectively, there is a 2 akchas tax levied for any slave sold or bought.³¹ In the defter of the Bosnian *sancak* for 1528 the total tax (*mukate*) collected on the Sarajevo and Livno slave markets was 1.000 and 600 akchas respectively.³² In 1540 the tax in Sarajevo increased to 2.000 akchas and decreased in Livno to 300 akchas. Slaves who converted to Islam could apply for freedom.³³

According to the Kuran the liberation of the slave is the most praiseworthy act, and many well-to-do Muslims bought Dalmatian slaves and after their conversion to Islam liberated them. For example Murat-*bej* Tardić, the first *sancak-bej* of Klis³⁴ was a liberated slave of Husrev-*bej* the most prominent conqueror of Dalmatia.

Was the brilliant carrier of Murad-*bej* Tardić characteristic of other Christian slaves? There were many other less fortunate cases. On 3 September 1571 the Ottomans filled their first ranks with Christian captives, preventing the crew of besieged Zadar from opening artillery fire on the Muslims.³⁵ Some slaves were bought off. A woman named Margarita from the island Hvar ran into debt to redeem her husband from Ottoman captivity.³⁶ Someone named Ivan Stanojević accepted a loan from Luka Bogljušić for buying off his brother Luka from Ottoman captivity.³⁷

In contrast to Islam which had an open-door policy, the Catholic church accepted conversion from Islam to Catholicism reluctantly. On 10 September 1549 the monks of Benedictine monasteries in Zadar sent the envoy Petar de Bassanis to Venice to ask the government to exclude Turks from the welcome their monasteries gave to travelers. In addition in the conclusions of the church council of Zadar bishops forbade hospitality towards Muslims and even their communication with Catholic women. Muslims were not allowed to visit the churches, view church art and other holy matter, or attend mass.³⁸

The rules were frequently broken. The rector of Split continued sending stories to the Venetian government during the Cyprus war, writing about the love between Adil, an 18 year old Ottoman merchant and a 14 year old girl from Split named Marija Vornić. Adil used to sell wax, honey and clothing on the Split market where he attracted a lot of buyers due to his honesty and moderate prices. Marija's parents heard the rumors and were stunned, saying that she had shamed

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *Kanuni i Kanun-name...*, 7.

³² A. HANDŽIĆ, 1980, 251.

³³ According to M. Noel, in 1528 these freed slaves made up nearly 8 per cent of the entire population of Sarajevo (M. NOEL, 1994, 67).

³⁴ Ibid, 241-252.

³⁵ V. SOLITRO, 1989, 175.

³⁶ S. PLANČIĆ, 1984, 165.

³⁷ Ibid, 165.


³⁸ M. S. TRALJIĆ, 1959, 215.

their home by falling in love with an Ottoman and, following the advice of their priest Damjan Tupić, they forced Marija into a monastery. However, Adil offered her parents his conversion to Catholicism. The Vornić family did not accept his proposal and proposed to the Venetian authorities that Adil be prevented from entering the town. Marija died soon afterwards and was buried in the monastery cemetery.³⁹ Does this story confirm or rather weaken our theory about an impenetrable social and cultural border between the two Dalmatias?

The interventionism of the Ottoman state

In spite the fact that the Ottomans distributed land in Dalmatia to their soldiers, that the taking of prisoners contributed to the growth of the Muslim population in both Bosnia and Dalmatia, and that there were examples of people crossing the Ottoman border and deliberately accepting Islam, as far as Ottoman Dalmatia was concerned Islamization proceeded at a very slow pace. Catholics fled to Venetian Dalmatia and the Orthodox population, protected by their large autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, were not prone to convert.

Chart 2 - The distribution of the Muslim population in towns and villages in the two nahiyas of Dalmatia, Source: F. Spaho, "Jedan turski popis...", 21-120.




As a rule Christians settled only in villages (*karye*). There were also villages populated entirely by Muslims, such as Hrvace, Obrovac and Civljani. Unfortunately there is no evidence whether their inhabitants were converted Catholics or recent Muslim settlers. Dalmatian towns under Ottoman control had according to *defters*, completely Muslim populations. The Ottomans tried to revive new life in vacant towns. In 1604 there were 151 Muslim households in the town

³⁹ V. SOLITRO, 1989, 208.

of Sinj of the Sinj-Cetina *nahiya* and 179 households in the surrounding villages (Chart 2). The ratio between town and village Muslim households is 47 to 68 in the neighboring Vrlika *nahiya*. According to Ottoman regulations there were two types of towns: *kasaba* and *varos*. Sinj, Klis, Vrlika, Drniš, Knin, Zemunik and Hrvace reached the privileged status of *kasaba*. In the beginning of the Ottoman conquest there was no town of this status because the Dalmatian population had fled. In the course of the 16th century the rest of the population fled and some of these towns were absolutely vacant. According to the defter from 1550 there were no civilians in Obrovac nor in Skradin in spite of the fact that there were people there at the beginning of Ottoman sovereignty.⁴⁰ There were only six households in Skradin in 1574. But at the turn of the century the town continued to grow rapidly because of its strategically important position. This is why it had 200 households in the 1620s (Chart 3). The model of Skradin highlighted the rise of other Dalmatian towns under Ottoman control. There were no non-Muslim inhabitants in Sinj and Vrlika in 1604. The Ottomans attracted the settlement of Muslims by granting the population freedom of taxes and by building mosques. In the *nahiya* Skradin in 1574 there were 36 Muslim households in 20 of which (55%) the householder's name was Abdullah (servant of God), a label given to newconverts (Chart 4). The percentage of householders named Abdullah in the Sinj - Cetina *nahiya* in 1604 is 8,5% (28 out of 330) and 14% (16 out of 135), which proves that the second part of the 16th century was the most intensive period of conversion in Dalmatia.

Chart 3 - The number of Muslim households in the three towns of Ottoman Dalmatia; Sources: F. Spaho, "Skradinska nahija...", Acta hist.-oecon...,vol. 16, 79-107; "Jedan turski...", Acta hist.-oecon...,vol.12, 21-120; D. Mandić, Etnička povijest...,329.




⁴⁰ F. SPAHO, 1989a, 241-242.

This is why the absolutely vacated towns of early and mid-16th century such as Obrovac, Skradin, Vrana and Sinj reached the *kasaba* status of a prosperous community. In 1604 entirely Muslim Sinj had 100 households, Vrlika 85, Drmiš 200, Knin 300, Skradin 200 and so forth.⁴¹

This development was stirred up by state policy. The Sultan ordered the *sancak-bej* of Klis Ferhadbeg Sokolović to build a mosque, a school and shops.⁴² The rector of the Venetian town of Šibenik informed his government on 9 March 1574 that the Ottomans had built mosques in the villages on the Šibenik hinterland captured during the recent Cyprus war. He added that in the small village of Dameline the Ottomans had turned a fortress into a mosque.⁴³ The same was the case in Solin where the best looking house served as a mosque.⁴⁴ Without the sultan's order Ferhadbeg personally granted the Zemunik, Hrvace and Sinj Muslim communities many institutions and facilities provided by the taxes from his large estates. From the military point of view this was the frontier and a strategically important region. This is why the Ottomans filled Dalmatia with military garrisons, granted the soldiers either a salary or, much more often, land, trying to tie them down and encourage their staying in the border zone.

Chart 4 - The percentage of Muslim householders with the patronymic surname Abdullah, Sources: F. Spaho, "Skradinska nahija...", pp. 79-107; "Jedan turski popis...", 21-120.



⁴¹ P. ŽIVKOVIĆ, 1994, 132.


⁴² Ibid, 245.

⁴³ V. SOLITRO, 1989, 177.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 184.

In spite of significant changes in the Islamization process, especially in Dalmatian towns, Islamization was based on a tiny core of the Dalmatian population. According to the estimation of the Venetian proveditor-general Jacopo Foscarini there were 6.860 households in the Klis *sancak* in Dalmatia not including the Bosnian part of this unit. In this figure there were only 560 Muslim households (Chart 5). Moreover Foscolo estimating the combat readiness of his unit, wrote that the Christian population willingly participated in the Muslim attacks against Venetian Dalmatia. He proposed to grant Christians a guarantee of settlement in the Venetian part because they were prone to take part in uprisings against the Ottomans.


Chart 5 - The ratio between Christian and Muslim households in the Dalmatian part of the Sanjak of Klis in 1572 according to estimation of the Venetian providor Foscarini, Source: I. Grgić, "Opis Kliškog sandžaka..."ZR, V, 1956, pp. 253-261.



In spite of the Ottoman efforts to Islamize Ottoman Dalmatia, this part of the Bosnian *eyalet* was overwhelmingly populated by Christians. In 1604 in the Vrlika *nahiya* there were 115 Muslim and 191 Christian households (Chart 6). According to another defter for 1604 in the neighboring Sinj - Cetina *nahiya* the ratio was 330 to 699 households respectively.

The entire 16th century passed in unsuccessful attempts at the Islamization of Dalmatia by the Ottomans. Between 1603 and 1624 there were many uprisings in the entire *sancak* of Klis. The failure of Islamization jeopardized Ottoman Dalmatia in the course of the 17th century in both the Candian (1645-1699) and finally Wiener (1683-1699) wars. The Christian population took part in freeing all of Ottoman Dalmatia from Turkish control. Apart from Dalmatia's geographical separation from Bosnia by the high mountainous chain of Dinara which made the Ottoman position in the province strategically vulnerable, the question of the Vlachs and their unsuccessful acculturation into the political, economical and ideological system proved to be of key importance for the future.

Chart 6 - The number of Christian and Muslim households in the three Ottoman nahiyas of Dalmatia, Sources: F. Spaho, "Skradinska nahija...", 79-107; "Jedan turski popis...", 21-120.



Coexistence

During the Candian war in April 1647, according to an unknown eyewitness the Venetians shelled the walls of the besieged Ottoman town Vrana for eleven days and nights. The town was not able to resist despite the fact that the besieged citizens "miraculously" repaired during the night the damage caused by shelling during the day. After entering the town the commander-in-chief Foscolo allowed the massacre of Ottoman soldiers and plunder to last 2 days. Moreover, the Venetian soldiers spent four additional days destroying the town. After that general Foscolo considered the siege to be over.⁴⁵

In the same year, during the siege of the Ottoman town of Zemunik, the Venetians aimed the artillery at civilian targets rather than the walls, shelling the town each half an hour and causing great loss of life. The morale of the besieged broke when the mosque was destroyed, because this was perceived as a sign from God.⁴⁶

As far as wars were concerned this kind of behavior was typical for Ottoman - Venetian relations in Dalmatia. Venetian Dalmatia lost its population, cattle and economic perspective. Wars in the 16th century were frequent, and in the 17th century long-lasting. Relations in Dalmatia depended upon the global relations between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. Economically dependent on the trade with the Ottoman part of the Eastern Mediterranean, Venice made efforts to appease the Ottomans.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 278.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 301-302.

The situation in Dalmatia could inflame or ameliorate global relations. This is why on 23 January 1562 the doge Girolamo Priuli warned the rector of Zadar Benedicto Contareno not to allow Ottoman peasants on Venetian territory, or Venetian subjects on Ottoman territory to settle upon arable land, or to take a lease on the land for farming or pasture. The doge wanted to avoid any possibility of jeopardizing the tranquil relations between the Ottomans and Venetians.⁴⁷ The same doge Girolamo Priuli on 22 September 1564 advised the rector of Zadar Pisani to show the utmost courtesy in the forecoming negotiations with the *sancak* of Klis in order to maintain peaceful relations with the Sultan's subjects.⁴⁸ Moreover, "none should dare go to Turkey nor send a letter to Turks" proclaimed the rector of Split Nicolo Corer on 21 December 1580. If one received a letter from a Turk one should bring it to the rector's office and show it to him. Moreover, none should do damage to Turks in any matter. The threat of punishment in galley service or exile for anyone who jeopardized the peace on the border shows the rector's desire to avoid misunderstandings.⁴⁹ Moreover, his successor Marco Barbarigo, on 24 May 1584 announced that nobody from the neighboring villages of Kaštela within the municipality of Split, should dare work on Turkish land or speak or trade with Turks. The punishment for disobeying this order was galley service, exile or a fine.

In addition to the utmost courtesy, the Venetian authorities tried to maintain their relations with Ottomans with presents. On 18 February 1563 the *sancak-bej* of Klis came to negotiate in Salona and the authorities of Venetian Split welcomed him with vine, lemons, oranges, bread, wax-candle, linen, cakes and sugar in 715 liras and 9 solids.⁵⁰ Immediately after the Cyprus war, on 26 May 1573 the *sancak-bej* of Klis and his 30 representatives visited Split. Hosting them with vine, bread, meat and sugar costed the town 55 liras and 8 solids.⁵¹

The number of Ottoman visitors to the Dalmatian towns was so large that the rector of Zadar Pisani was warned by the Venetian government on 10 November 1565 to limit gifts to Turks to 100 ducats during the rector's mandate. A large sum of money might be spent only with the doge's permission.⁵² During the rector's mandate of Alvise Cornaro, the Klis *sancak-bejs* Alibeg in 1575 and Mustafa in the following year visited him in Trogir. Moreover numberless Ottoman counts and captains visited him, and he had to give them gifts. Otherwise they would have forbidden trade between their subjects and the Venetians.⁵³

In spite of coexistence there was no guarantee of smooth relations. In his *relatio* from 22 December 1593 the former rector of Šibenik Antonio Da Ca Pesaro pointed out that it was very unpleasant to have *sancak-bejs* of Klis and Knin as neighbors of this town, because they were always prone to attack the hinterland of Trogir and ask for tribute. He had to bribe not only the *sancak-bejs*, but all lower officials, otherwise they would make great trouble, attacking Venetian territory,

⁴⁷ I. PEDERIN, 1985, 151.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 152-153.

⁴⁹ PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Proclamazione*, 122, 2, 61.

⁵⁰ PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Blagajničke knjige*, 18, II, 1563.

⁵¹ Ibid, 172, 26a.

⁵² I. PEDERIN, 1985, 144.

⁵³ CRV, IV, 328.

capturing and killing people and forbidding the supply of food, especially grain and meat.⁵⁴ In spite of the formal ending of hostilities the Turks in 1593 kidnapped two women on the water-mills of Solin, but the rector succeeded in liberating them through negotiation.⁵⁵ The proveditor-general Filippo Pasqualigo summarized the situation in his *relatio* on 13 February 1613, stressing that on the border with the Turks there was increasing danger of attack by Turkish units. The most problematic was the border of Zadar due to the anti-Venetian activities supported by Halilbeg - *sancak-bej* of Knin, who received part of the booty.⁵⁶

By and large, despite the numerous provocations on the border area caused overwhelmingly by the Ottomans, relations between the Turks and Venetians on the Dalmatian periphery generally involved political and trade cooperation. In 1598 the rector of Zadar Giulio Contarini stressed the peaceful relationship between the Ottomans and the Dalmatian population.⁵⁷ Because of excellent relations with the Turks the rector of Trogir Bernardo Venier managed to guarantee the inhabitants of his municipality "plenty of grain and peace".⁵⁸ Economic relations eased political tensions. The Ottomans had their own motives. Venetian Dalmatia represented their door to the outside world. On 15 June 1619 the Sultan warned the *sancak-bej* of Klis to avoid any injustices to Venetian subjects on his territory.⁵⁹

At the end of the 16th century the stabilization of political relations with the Ottoman Balkans allowed the revival of the Venetian Balkan trade system to a greater extent than in the pre-Ottoman period. However Venice had to be much more courteous and tactful in dealing with the Ottoman Empire than with the feudal Balkan states to earlier centuries.

Trade

On 25 October 1553 the doge Marcantonio Trivisano announced to the rector of Zadar Antonio Civrano the decision of the Council of Ten to expel the Jewish Jahnus living in the town from Venetian territory. The doge issued a new decision on 21 October according to which Christian or Jewish book-store keepers or other tradesmen had to hand in to the local rector in eight days all copies of the Talmud and anything in connection with it. He had to send all copies to Venice to be burned publicly on the Square of San Marco. Those violating this order would be punished with jail, galley service or exile.⁶⁰

Forty years later - in 1592 - Venice accepted the plan of the Jew Daniel Rodrigo to build a warehouse in the Split port for attracting merchants from all over the world. What motivated Venice to start this ambitious program? Apart from wanting trade route to the Eastern Mediterranean along the eastern part of the Adriatic sea, Venice wanted to penetrate with trade the territories of the Balkans and

⁵⁴ CRV, V, 81.

⁵⁵ PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Blagajničke knjige*, 151, 189.

⁵⁶ CRV, VI, 186.

⁵⁷ CRV, V, 231.

⁵⁸ CRV, V, 150-151.

⁵⁹ PAZd, *Dragomanski arhiv*, kutija 24, fil. CXXVI, poz. 5.

⁶⁰ PAZd, *Ducale e terminazione*, III, 1127.

to maintain and develop the trade with this area. This was to substitute for the loss of Venetian markets caused by a reorientation of world trade to other routes and the appearance of the great colonial powers. Moreover, Venice sought to break the monopolistic position of Dubrovnik as far as trade with the Ottoman Balkans was concerned.

As soon as the period of raids and skirmishes connected with the three wars of 1463-1479, 1499-1502 and 1537-40 subsided, Venetian Dalmatia recovered and got accustomed to new circumstances in the Balkans.

An initiative for developing the commercial relationship came from the Ottoman side also. Before the official end of the war of the Holy League of 1537-40, the Ottoman authorities in the fall of 1539 proposed the revival of the export of Ottoman grain to Venetian towns to a much larger extent. Due to a very abundant harvest on his territory, the *sancak-bej* of Bosnia offered grain to rectors of Venetian towns, mentioning the large sums of *ducats* which Venetians spend purchasing grain from Sicily and Apulia. The envoy of the Bosnian *sanjak* promised that they would be allowed to purchase grain in desirable amounts. The Venetians accepted the offer, appointed their trade representative and proposed Split as a main port for trading.

The question of importing grain from the Balkan hinterland was of life-and-death importance for Dalmatian towns. During the long Venetian-Ottoman war of 1463-79 grain from Bosnia did not enter the towns of Venetian Dalmatia. In spite of this, in the beginning of the 16th century, some amount of grain flowed toward Dalmatia. Moreover, in June 1510, the envoys of Hercegovina and the *sancak-bej* of Skadar offered grain to Trogir. The flow of grain continued toward Split and some amount proceeded to Venice. Despite Ottoman preparations for an attack on Venetian Istra in autumn of 1532, and the gathering of food for this campaign, the flow of grain to Dalmatia continued at such a level that Venice sent some to Venetian Cyprus which was at that time faced with scarcity.

As far as importing grain from the Ottoman territories is concerned, the Venetians were attracted by prices which did not significantly differ in this period from Western prices, making for a significant discrepancy between Venetian and Ottoman state regulated prices. The trade was stimulated by devaluation of the Ottoman currency, because foreign tradesmen paid with stable currency.

One of the main characteristics of the price of the Ottoman grain is a stable low price until about 1560, as opposed to prices in Western Europe and Venetian Dalmatia which were influenced by the phenomenon of the "price revolution".⁶¹ According to *defters* the prices in the Ottoman hinterland were: in 1528 - 15 akchas/*kejl* (1 *kejl* = 100 pounds), in 1574 and 1604 25 akchas/*kejl*). Venetian grain was much more expensive. Around 1565 the price of *kejl* in Venetian Dalmatia was 60 akchas. This discrepancy in prices started the struggle for the grain surplus between the Ottoman land-holders and the mostly Christian peasantry because both of these social and political groups were eager to sell grain on the markets of Dalmatian towns. In the long-run this social struggle of "second feudalism" strategically weakened the Ottoman Empire, particularly its border

⁶¹ B. HRABAK, 1983, 564.

areas. This is why the rector of Split Nicola Corarius in the *proclamazione* of 21 December 1580 stopped the smuggling of Ottoman goods demanding surveillance and his personal permission for their export to Venice. Moreover the smugglers even entered the town using the windows of houses situated in the walls of Split.⁶²

Limited Dalmatian districts could not satisfy their own need for grain, so the accounts of the Venetian administration are full of data of production, spending and import of Ottoman grain. In the *relatio* of Cristofor Canal, the rector of Zadar in 1594, it is stated that the whole territory of Zadar produces grains for only 4 months: there is no grain production on the islands due to infertile soil, and as far as the hinterland is concerned there were no inhabitants for cultivating the soil. In this condition, the Venetians authorities were forced to seek bread in hostile territory which could forbid any export.

During the 1560s the Trogir municipality suffered hunger because the import of Ottoman grain ceased. In the *relatio* of Nikola Priuli the rector of Trogir on 1 May 1575 stated that after the Candian war the inhabitants started to cultivate the soil again. In spite of abundant sowing, the commune could meet its needs only for 6 months, so it had to import from Apulia and Bosnia.⁶³

There was sometimes even a grain surplus for export to Venice. In 1560s the Venetian "Office for grain" negotiated imports of grain from Ottoman Dalmatia.⁶⁴

By and large the export of Ottoman grain supplied Venetian Dalmatia, which was affected by a lack of fertile territories. Moreover, it stirred up in-fighting within the Ottoman Empire over the grain surplus.

The structure of the other goods was typical of the centuries-long trade running through Dalmatian ports. From the sea side came salt, manufactured goods and spices. There was a specialization in trade. Zadar became the main spot for exporting cattle over the sea, and Split and Obrovac for salt into the Ottoman hinterland. Two politically separate territories fitted each other and continued to cooperate.

According to the tax registers of the Dalmatian port of Split from October 1548 to June 1549 there were 100 trade contacts concerning the purchase of horses from the Ottoman territory drawn up in the market of this Dalmatian town. At the end of the 16th century - in 1590 and 1595 - 1.317 and 1.474 horses were sold respectively.⁶⁵ This is why the rector of Split Marco Barbarigo announced on 12 March 1586 that one who would like to buy horses from Turks had to inform the office of the rector to prevent the purchase of stolen horses which might jeopardize Venetian - Ottoman relationships on this border.

The trade routes follow mainly ancient Roman and medieval communications. The most important were from Sinj to Split via Klis and from Zadar to Knin and further toward Croatia and the Panonia basin (*magna exercitus, via exercitulis*). The caravan composed of horses and mules needed organization and equipment. As opposed to sea trade, trade by land was inefficient, dangerous

⁶² PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Proclamazione*, 122, 2, 58.

⁶³ PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Ducale et Terminazione*, III, 1279.

⁶⁴ B. HRABAK, 1983, 329.

⁶⁵ PAZd, Splitski arhiv, *Blagajničke knjige* for 1590, 1595.

and affected by disease and robberies. To trade with Ragusa and Venetian Dalmatia the Ottomans tried to build their own system of ports, constructing warehouses in Makarska, Obrovac and Karin.⁶⁶

In the middle of the 16th century, Venetian sources estimated trade to be 400.000 *ducats* per year.⁶⁷ The Venetian official visitor Giustiniano estimated the trade of the Dalmatian port Šibenik to be 50.000 *ducats* per year.⁶⁸ This is why in 1587 the rector of Šibenik Luca Falier claimed that, due to abundant trade, Šibenik enjoyed the best living standards of all Dalmatian towns.⁶⁹

The Venetians responded with salt. In the *relatio* from 1596 the proveditor-general Cristofor Valiero claimed that Venice had a great profit from salt. Salt attracted Ottoman subjects to come to Dalmatian towns bringing grain, meat, cheese and so forth.

In spite of production by the Ottoman salt-pans which covered a third of Bosnian needs, the rest was covered by the salt-pans from Ragusa or Venetian Dalmatian territories. There is evidence that Bosnia in 1540 suffered a great scarcity of salt due to war with Venetians which stopped the salt trade.⁷⁰

The proveditor-general of Dalmatia Benedetto Moro even claimed that the salt-trade, or rather the construction of the custom house, ended the Ottoman raids on the Šibenik hinterland. On 10 April 1525 *emin* Džafer Čelebija reached a settlement according to which Ottoman subjects from Bosnia could come to Šibenik and import salt on condition that seven akchas from the salt trade belonged to the Venetians and six to the Ottomans. The Ottoman *emin* guaranteed that he would prevent any attack or harm on Šibenik territory. In the same year profits reached 3.600 *ducats* and in 1553 10.000. Thus, Antonio Diedo in 1553 claimed that in Šibenik the whole population lived from trade with the Ottoman hinterland based mostly on the exporting of Dalmatian salt.⁷¹

Salt became a strategic Adriatic good which enabled the economic and even political stabilization of the province. The Cyprus war emptied the treasury of the Šibenik municipality, so the rector was unable to pay off many of its employees. He claimed that the salt trade in the future would prevent such an unpleasant situation. Beside its economic importance, salt had a political significance which Venice used to stabilize its political relationships with its hinterlands. The salt trade attracted Ottoman subjects to the markets of Dalmatian towns. Sharing in the profits stirred the interest of the Ottoman authorities in maintaining good relations between the two states, which was a precondition for the political and economic maintenance of Venetian Dalmatia.

Simultaneously, trade neutralized the skirmishes on the border and improved relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.

⁶⁶ B. HRABAK, 1983, 563.

⁶⁷ CRV, XI, 3.

⁶⁸ CRV, VIII, 205, 215.

⁶⁹ CRV, IV, 400.

⁷⁰ A. HANDŽIĆ, 1961, 141.

⁷¹ CRV, III, 3, 15, 127.

Conclusion

After they had overrun Bosnia (1463) in the mid 15th century the Ottomans began to threaten Venetian sovereignty in neighboring Dalmatia, moving their border from the Balkan interior to the narrow and shallow Adriatic coastal belt of the Dalmatian districts. Faced with a vacated territory, the Ottomans used Orthodox Vlachs for repopulating the strategically important fringes toward Venetian Dalmatia. Moreover, the Ottomans tried to encourage the Islamization processes in Dalmatia as a guarantee for the stability of this area. Islamization came mainly from Ottoman soldiers settled in the Dalmatian garrisons, refugees from neighboring Venetian Dalmatia, Christian slaves granted liberty after conversion to Islam and probably from some of the pre-Ottoman population.

However, the new proximity forced both Venice and the Ottoman Empire to build and adapt their mutual relationships. The spectrum of coexistence included wars, raids and skirmishes, but also everyday communication through trade, visits, personal friendships and love. Although the Ottomans tried to Islamize part of Dalmatia under their control, encouraging the rebuilding of vacated towns, Ottoman sovereignty held over a tiny core of the population.

This is why the most effective Venetian weapon in the long-term was the Ottoman economic crisis which burdened the Turkish military efforts. The agricultural crisis in the Mediterranean, the price revolution and above all the cost of endless wars, commercialized the Ottoman society, making the *timar* system of "second feudalism" socially and economically inappropriate. The regular tithes collected from the peasantry became worthless because of inflation, which opened the struggle for a land market. This increased the pressure on the Christian population in inner Dalmatia. Thus, trade links and contacts were convenient for stabilization and pacification. The establishment of a trading system, networks of ferries and ports attracted mainly foreign trading capital. Strategic raw materials, salt and wheat were regulators of political relations. While Venetian salt and weapons were bait, the source of high profits even for the Sultan, Osmanli wheat was a strategic material for the spatially narrowed Dalmatian districts. Imports commercialized the Osmanli economy of the hinterland, and attracted the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects toward Venetian Dalmatia. Thus, the social, religious and political factors which by that time had become the basis of Venetian agitation with its roots dating back to the Osmanli conquests, would be used fully by Venice during the War of Vienna at the end of the 17th century. Venice was definitely able to unite the area militarily and politically thanks mainly to Christian participation.

Whether the Ottoman combatant had any chance to win the love of the rector's daughter has been our primary question. It seems that he might see her, either on raids into the Zadar hinterland during the periods of peaceful political relations or as a merchant bringing goods from the Dalmatian hinterland to the market of Zadar. He might see her also entering the town as a member of an official Ottoman delegation to visit Venetian authorities. However, if the red line separating the Ottoman territory from the Venetian one in the hinterland of Šibenik drawn by *Pračat-bej* was political and visible, the Venetian line was cultural, religious and invisible. This kind of border the Ottoman combatant was not allowed to cross.

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Josip Vrandečić: JE LI TURSKOM KONJANIKU MOGLA BITI UZVRAĆENA LJUBAV KĆERI ZADARSKOG REKTORA?

(Islam u "Turskoj Dalmaciji" u 16. i 17. stoljeću i njegova koegzistencija sa susjednim kršćanskim svijetom dalmatinskih komuna)

S a ž e t a k

Tijekom 15. stoljeća, osobito nakon pada Bosanskog kraljevstva (1463.) Turci su počeli ugrožavati mletački suverenitet u susjednoj Dalmaciji, pomičući granicu Carstva prema uskom pojasu distrikta dalmatinskih komuna. Suočeni s pustom osvojenom zemljom Hrvatskog kraljevstva na području Dalmatinske zagore, Turci su upotrijebili pravoslavne Vlahu za naseljavanje ovog, strateški važnog ruba Carstva. Štoviše, tijekom 16. stoljeća nastojali su ohrabriti islamizaciju na novoosvojenim područjima kao garanciju za stabilnost područja. Izvori širenja islama uglavnom su bile vojne posade, izbjeglice iz mletačkog dijela i robovi kojima je nakon konverzije na islam podarena sloboda. Premda su Turci nastojali ohrabriti islamizaciju obnavljajući osvojene gradove, njihov suverenitet je počivao na tankim osnovama jer je doseljeno stanovništvo u većini ostalo vjerno pravoslavlju, koje je u Carstvu uživalo posebnu garanciju.

Novna politička situacija prisilila je Mlečane i Turke u Dalmaciji na uzajamne odnose koji se kreću od ratova, provala i grabeža pa do svakodnevnog trgovačke komunikacije, čestih posjeta, osobnih prijateljstava i ljubavnih odnosa. Pritom je prelazanje političke, vjerske i kulturološke granice poželjnije s turske negoli mletačke strane.

Već u drugoj polovici 16. stoljeća pokazala se ekonomska slabost Turskog Carstva. Poljoprivredna kriza na Mediteranu, revolucija cijena i iznad svega stalni ratovi, komercijalizirali su društvo Carstva, uvjetujući timarski sistem socijalno i ekonomski neprikladnim. Inflacija je obezvrijedila regularna davanja seljaštva, što je i u Dalmaciji otvorilo borbu za tržište i povećalo pritisak na seljaštvo.

Dugoročno je mletačko-turska trgovina u Dalmaciji stabilizirala političke odnose ali i privukla nemuslimansko stanovništvo dalmatinskog zaleđa u mletačku ekonomsku i političku sferu. Koristeći se protu-turskim raspoloženjem u susjedstvu Republika je u Bečkom ratu (1683.-1699.) konačno ovladala prostorom sve do Dinare.