About the unique language of philosophy and sciences and about the interpretation of speech

Abstract

The interest of linguistics in language is different from the interest of philosophy in language: the former is interested in the problems of structure of different languages while the latter is interested in the possibility of building up a unique universal language. It was only with the rise of modern logic that philosophical interpretation of a (universal) language became possible (which could be of use to the linguists, too). But the founding of such a language needs an outside base, that is, all of its terminology should be possible to reduce to the terminology of a certain separate science. The thesis of physicalism comes from such an approach. The belief is that the semantic concepts cannot be justified if they are not explained in a physicalistic way, that is to say, with some other non-semantic concepts. The condition is that no science can be defined with its own terms and that there should be at least one scientific basis (for example; physicalism) which could be justified with its own terminology, that is in some reflexive way. In modern linguistics (generative grammar) apart from the investigation of the empirical propositions, there is an attempt to epistemologically build a theory with a unique scientific language (for example, that of biology). A new interesting thesis states that it is not necessary to build such a theoretical base and that it is possible to build an interpretation of language without taking into account its epistemological basis. In such a case the stress is put on the interpretation of segments and on the argumentative procedures.