The Knowledge of Language

Abstract

The author discusses the question about the knowledge of language as knowledge of linguistic rules. What does Chomsky's statement that the speakers tacitly know their grammar mean? Is this knowledge propositional knowledge, llial is knowledge-that or is it only knowledge how as possession of a cognitive skill or ability. The author tries to show that, although Chomsky speakes about propositional knowledge of language, that is about the knowledge-that, his argumentation can only plausibly be intérpeted as knowledge-how. The following objections are discussed 1. The arguments given by the philosopher Gilbert Harman (1967); 2. Two objections given by the philosopher Stephen Stich (1971, 1976). The author introduces the discussion about the controvertial argumentation that the knowledge of language is like bicycle riding and shows that Chomsky has not successfully explained the difference between bicycle riding and knowledge of language, i.e. language competence. His reliance on the innate knowledge and the computational processes gives more support to the statement that knowledge of language is knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. Furthermore in his defence of the propositional knowledge of language Chomsky finds support in modern epistemology. The author of the article tries to show that the support he finds in naturalized epistemology, especially in the work of John Pollock, actually gives more credence to the contrary thesis, that is, that language competence is knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. Chomsky talks about innate knowledge, unconscious knowledge and (conscious) knowledge. The conscious knowledge, according to his words.is not interesting for cognitive psychology. The knowledge of language about which lie talks about is innate and unconscious knowledge. The speakers know (i.e. ’cognize') language universal, they know dial all human languages have transformational rules, i.e. they know linguistic theory. Using Pollock's terminology it seems clear that this is 'procedural' knowledge, knowledge for which the speakers, paradoxically speaking, do not know that they possess. The plausibility of Harman’s objection, then Shell's arguments and the statements of modern cpislemologisls point to the fact that Chomsky did not succeed to show that knowledge of language as the possession of language competence is knowledge-that but more plausibly indicate that language competence is knowledge-how, that this is a cognitive ability or skill.