M. Proust, I. Svevo, J. Joyce, and the problem of time

Abstract

Starting from three fundamental interpretations of time in philosophy, i.e. from the mechanical, spiritualistic-intuitive and existentialistic theory Husserl’s interpretation being dealt with as an inter theory in relation to the second and the third, the has analyzed the main works by M. Proust, I. Svevo and J. Joyce. The aim is to point to their different conceptions of time and to establish which one is the nearest to the third as the most relevant conception. It has been shown that Proust rejected Bergson’s spiritualistic theory, employing purely phenomenological synesthetic evocations and relation to the past. He consequently affirmed the present and the final character of time. However, as he could not come to terms with such a solution he turned to Plato and his relation of past and present in an out-of-time moment of eternity. So it actually turned out that Proust strove after the Platonic conception of eternity, not after Bergson’s conception of duration. But after the phenomenological experience he went through beforehand as compared with Husserl, the time found could not be eternity. Therefore, in his last work, »Time Found«, II, Proust denies Plato’s metabole, too. Proust’s dilemma, which was shown in alternately accepting and rejecting various theories of time, could be solved only on the existentialistic level. But he could not raise himself to it, because owing to the deterministic idae of choise his conception of retention did not evolute to the conception of protention and, therefore, Proust’s »time found« become time lost« again. The analysis of Svevo’s works has shown that he abandoned the spiritualistic conception. By means of the phenomenological one he approached the third interpretation. Unlike Proust, Sve thought of retention as of protention at the same time, which was especially obvious from his conception of »the future of memory«. As all his main characters are old people who have no future, it was difficult for him to grasp the dimension of time important for the third conception, i. e. the future. Nevertheless, Svevo knew how to convey the pre-existentialist atmosphere, because he conceived of the possible as of various alternatives and felt the importance of choice. However, he was far from being able to denote the rational character of the criterion of choice, neither could he in the time he lived in. Joyce was interested in Svevo’is conception of time and it seems that he wanted to develop it further through the character of Bloom, who personifies Svevo himself. In spite of it, and of the frequent phenomenological explorations of the problems of past and present, he does not succeed, and actually revives the spiritualistic theory, giving even an apotheosis of eternity in »Ulysses«. More often than Proust he faces the problem of the future, but after repeating Proust’s, phenomenological, and Svevo’s ways of interpreting the future he gives it a character of potentiality more often tian the character of real possibility. Neither in Finnegans Wake did he succeed to conceive of the choice differently than as an insolubility of alternatives and hopelessness. The author concludes that Joyce was in a far more favourable situation than Svevo, but he did not succeed to attain the existentialist level. He turned baok to the spiritualistic conception of time, which not even Proust was satisfied with. The author points out that Svevo’s output is probably better in its literary-artistic value also. Namely, his works are more communicative as compared to Proust’s casual association reminding of dreams, but especially if compared to Joyce’s schizophrenic abstract-logical and condensed stereotypies of words.