Antirealism/realism of Wittgenstein's language-game idea

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s language-game idea allews/us te find out both, antirealistic and realistic tendencies, what is required te abanden classification an realistic and antirealistic (constructivistic, instrumentalistic) approaches in semantics and methodology of science/that originated in discussions on the philosophy of mathematics. Using some relevant commentators of Wittgenstein’s works (Dummett, Baker, Hintikka, Kiripke. C. Wright etc.) a broader notion of realism will be obtained using the following questions:

            A. human reality: natural history or forms of life (behaviour, practice, training, customs and institutions — language-games and correct use),

            B. new objectivity: community, agreement (criterion - following rules),

            C. the new nuance in the nation of truth: justification, verification (proof as an method of verification). The results of the analysis will be the impontant for a new criterion of realism such as: the general notion of reality, objectivity as intersubjectivity and the nuances in the notion of truth.

With the new criterion we have the following map of realism:

            1. F-rege-Tarski-Carnap truth-conditional realism,

            2. Frege-Wittgenstein justification/verificatdonist realism,

            3. Frege-Wittgenstein-Hintikka verificationist/falsificationist realism.

The possibility of Frege-Wittgenstein-Dummett neoveificationist realism is open to further research.