Personal identity and brain continuity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15291/radovifpsp.2494Abstract
One aspect of the problem of personal identity is considered in this article. In the introduction, the main frame of die problem is stated. After the exposition of the logically possible case of (whole) brain transplantation and the exposition of psychological criterion of personal identity, we introduce the problem of neuron exchange, one by one. Neurons are pulled out from one brain of a certain person, one by one, and they are implemented into the another personYs brain. At the end of this operation, all the neurons which were constitutive of the brain of the person A are assembled again in the head of the person B. The question is who is the person who survives and retains its personal identity? Contrary to John Robinson, I argue that the person who survives and retains identity is the person whose brain received the neurons and not the person from whom the neurons were pulled out. The main reason is the very way in which the neuron change took place.