The necessity of externalist justification
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15291/radovifpsp.2622Abstract
Interalism as a theory of justified belief cannot solve the problems of epistemological regress and scepticism. The privileged status strategy leads us either to external ism or to the position according to which all of our beliefs are equally justified or unjustified. If all of our beliefs are equally unjustified we are back to scepticism, and if all of them are equally justified then the privileged status strategy is tenable no more. The only plausible solution seems to be the externalist interpretation of justification according to which justification is a matter of external factors not necessarilly accessible to the believer. Among externalist theories of justification congnitive process reliabilism seems to be the most promising.
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386, April 1988.
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«, Mind, No. 387., July 1988.
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3 March 1988.
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1988.
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