On the existence of qualia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15291/radovifpsp.2626Abstract
The notion of qualia (as qualitative Properties of our conscious experiences) is introduced through discussion of Daniel Dennett's Paper »Quining qualia«, where Dennett tries to show that the traditional concept of qualia is so thoroughly confused, arguing that it should be completely abandoned. Choosing the eliminative materialist's position, he denies the existence of qualia as mental properties. The Author's intention is to show that Dennett’s arguments for denying the existence of qualia are, at least, not conclusive.References
Patricia Churchland (1986); NEUROPHILOSOPHY, MIT Press)/A Bradford Book; Cambridge, Massachussets
Paul Churchland (1984); MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS, MIT Press/A Bradford Book; Cambridge, Massachussets
Paul Churchland (1985): »Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states«, Journal of Philosophy; Voi. LXXXII, January 1985.
Austen Clark (1985): »Qualia and the psychophysiological explanation of color perception«, Synthese; Vol. 65, str. 377 — 405, December 1985.
Daniel Dennett (unpublished): »Quining qualia«, Report No. 144/1987. Research Group on Perception and Action at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZIF), Bielefeld University
Frank Jackson (1982): »Epiphenomenal, qualia«, The Philosophical Quarterly, Voi. 32., No. 127., April 1982
Thomas Nagel (1974): »What is it like to be a bat?«, Philosophical Review, Voi. LXXXIII
Paul Churchland (1984); MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS, MIT Press/A Bradford Book; Cambridge, Massachussets
Paul Churchland (1985): »Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states«, Journal of Philosophy; Voi. LXXXII, January 1985.
Austen Clark (1985): »Qualia and the psychophysiological explanation of color perception«, Synthese; Vol. 65, str. 377 — 405, December 1985.
Daniel Dennett (unpublished): »Quining qualia«, Report No. 144/1987. Research Group on Perception and Action at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZIF), Bielefeld University
Frank Jackson (1982): »Epiphenomenal, qualia«, The Philosophical Quarterly, Voi. 32., No. 127., April 1982
Thomas Nagel (1974): »What is it like to be a bat?«, Philosophical Review, Voi. LXXXIII
