

## ANTIREALISM/REALISM OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LANGUAGE-GAME IDEA

HEDA FESTINI

Filozofski fakultet u Zadru

UDK: 801.54

Izvorni znanstveni rad

Primljeno: 1988 - 01-28

Wittgenstein's language-game idea allows/us to find out both, antirealistic and realistic tendencies, what is required to abandon classification on realistic and antirealistic (constructivistic, instrumentalistic) approaches in semantics and methodology of science/that originated in discussions on the philosophy of mathematics. Using some relevant commentators of Wittgenstein's works (Dummett, Baker, Hintikka, Kripke, C. Wright etc.) a broader notion of realism will be obtained using the following questions:

A. human reality: natural history or forms of life (behaviour, practice, training, customs and institutions — language-games and correct use),

B. new objectivity: community, agreement (criterion - following rules),

C. the new nuance in the notion of truth: justification, verification (proof as an method of verification). The results of the analysis will be the important for a new criterion of realism such as: the general notion of reality, objectivity as intersubjectivity and the nuances in the notion of truth.

With the new criterion we have the following map of realism:

1. Frege-Tarski-Carnap truth-conditional realism,
2. Frege-Wittgenstein justification/verificationist realism,
3. Frege-Wittgenstein-Hintikka verificationist/falsificationist realism.

The possibility of Frege-Wittgenstein-Dummett neververificationist realism is open to further research.

The frame of Wittgenstein's language-game idea in relation to TLP is generally accepted as a more flexible understanding of the way the language functions, because from the use of an expression there follow various linguistic functions, and various uses constitute language-games. But, the content of this is interpreted rather differently. Hintikka thinks that most current discourses on Wittgenstein's language-games are unsystematic in character (1971:99). Many of Wittgenstein's key-terms remained unclear, for inst. compare Bogen saying the term 'natural history' was too general (1972:213), or that the meaning of the term 'forms of life' was not explicitly formulated, according to Zabeeh (1971:329). It is well known that Wittgenstein was very unsystematic, so that his texts are ambiguous, lacking the distinction among linguistic (semantico-syn-

tactic), institutional, anthropological or behaviouristic framework (see 363).

Perhaps we shall contribute to the work on the systematisation of Wittgenstein's views, and to the clarification of many ambiguous notions if we try to compare his original texts with the result which we obtain from a survey of some of the interpretations of his works (this is, of course based on literature available to us).

It seems that it is important to organize the survey around three questions which were basic for Wittgenstein:

- A. human reality: natural history or forms of life (linguistic practice, training, customs and culture — language-games and correct use),
- B. new objectivity: community, agreement (criterion — following a rule),
- C. the new nuance in the notion of truth: justification, verification (proof).

In such a perspective Wittgenstein's language-game idea allows us to find not only antirealistic but realistic tendencies too. It even requires us to abandon the usual classification, into realistic and antirealistic (constructivistic, instrumentalistic) approaches to semantics and the methodology of science, a classification which originated in discussions on the philosophy of mathematics.

If we survey the interpretations of Wittgenstein's term 'forms of life' (FL), we obtain the following I map:

1. (FL) in biological framework (Hunter 1968:278—280),
  2. (FL) as styles of life with classtructure, the values, the religion, the types of industry (Malcolm 1954, Binkley 1973:80),
  3. linguistic activities and practice interconnected with (FL) (Hintikka 1968 a:55—56, Zabeeh 1971:346, Begen 1972:212, Cooper 1975:83, Brand 1975:123, Black 1978:325—326, Kripke 1982:96—98, see also XI map,1.a.):
    - a) with its own limits as in Kant's transcendental analysis (Toulmin 1969,1975:XII, Gier 1980), or
    - b) with own reason ground (Brand 1975:135),
    - c) as civilisation, culture:
- I (FL) is a fact of nature — philosophical antropology (Zabeeh 1971:432), or is coustomary behaviour-cultural anthropology (Rankin 1966, Bogen 1972:207, Binkley 1973),
- II (FL) in social context (Winch 1958:par.8, 1969:19, Lang 1971:152—153, Bogen 1972:207, Dilman 1973:170),
- III in semiotical appreach (H. Festini 1982:498—499),
4. (FL) as circumstances, occasions, conditions (Zabeeh 1971:343), or like regularities (Cooper 1975:83, Kripke 1982:98—99).

The biological interpretations were criticized by Kripke (1982:44), the anthropological interpretations by Wittgenstein himself (RFM II 65), interpretations 2. was criticized by Sherry (1977:159—167) and 3.c) I and II by Hintikka (1976:14).

II map (interpretations of 'natural history' (NH):

1. (FL) or natural history are not natural regularities, but it is raised by learning and training (Bogen 1972:190—192,212—213, Binkley 1973:100—107, Dilman 1973:166,183, Cooper 1975:83, Klenk 1976:120),

2. (FL) is obviously natural or belongs to natural history, it is regularities (Cooper 1975:82, Kripke 1982:97, Baker 1981:64).

III map (interpretations of linguistic practice, or ability, or mastery of technique by learning and training):

1. through examples (Bogen 1972:186,188,213, Dilman 1973:14, Brand 1975:126, Hintikka 1980:418, Dummett 1981:445),

2. through customs and institutions (Zabeeh 1971:363, Bogen 1972:128, 209, 217, Binkley 1973:95,96, Brand 1975:127),

3. as natural reactions (Cooper 1975:82, Dilman 1973:14,161,174).

There exists the tendency to understand Wittgenstein's notion of 'training' as linked to empirical regularity (Dummett 1959 b:179—180). In such a version the interpretation of 'training' included in III map 3. is wholly combined with II map 2. Number 1. of II map is well combined with 3. a) and b) of I map and number 2. of II map with 4. of I map. The last two maps we can combine in the following manner: II map 1. with III map 1., II map 2. with III map 3. So we can easily arrive at analogies between maps and conclude that it is possible to draw *three principal opinions concerning our A. question*:

1) I map 3. a), b)

II map 1.

III map 1.

2) I map 4.

II map 2.

III map 2., 3.

3) I map 3. c) I,II

II map 2.

III map 2.,3.

Let us see what permits Wittgenstein himself:

Ad) opinion 1):

in favour of I map 3. a),b) with explicitly used term (FL) or simple »our life« (PR 14,152,BRB 4,5,59,RFM I 186,PG 9,120, PI I 19,23,241—242,284,325,357,430,432,592, II<sub>I,XI</sub>, Z 99, RC 57, OC 32,46,73,358),

in favour of II map 1. with explicitly used term »natural history« or indirectly (BRD 97—98,77,80,89—90,95—96,104—5,120, PI I 25,415; 7—9,54,150—152,230,250, Z 71; 57,59,22,RC 39,53, OC 28),

in favour of III map 1. (BRE 98, RFM I 1—3, 72,139,II 11,III 30,V 1,36,46,PI I 5.6,7,9,20,31,33,39—43,53,54,58,79,86,125,143,150,185,190,197,199, 208,233,244,337,338,362,508,560,590,630,II<sub>X,XI</sub>, RC 30,32,OC 6,143,185,186, 206,250,270,338,340,409,492,556,590,693).

Ad) opinion 2):

in favour of I map 4. (BRB 137,145,147,157, without (FL) PI I 155, LC 2, 3, 58),

in favour of II map 2. often without (NH) (RFM I 43,34,44,116,121, RC 30,32),

in favour of III map 2.,3. (BRB 96, RFM I 20,160, PI I 199 II<sub>XI</sub>, Z 67).

Ad) opinion 3):

in favour of I map c) I and II, almost without (FL) (BRB 134, PG 155,204, RFM I 4,45,57,94,,3444,116,152, II 5, LC 8,34,PI I 19,23,241—242, 191,199, Z 29,67,164,499),

in favour of II map 2. often without (NH) (RFM I 43,34, 44,116,121, RC 30,32),

in favour of III map 2. and 3. (BRB 96, RFM I 20, 160, PI I 199, II<sub>XI</sub>, , Z 67).

Concluding the survey of questions we can say that Wittgenstein's texts favoured opinion 1) although they support in certain manner opinions 2) and 3). Some answers do not correspond entirely to either opinion, or are completely different as, for instance, »certainty as a form of life is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well« (OC 358), or (NH) is the sum of experiences (RC,p.32). However, we can summarize: the language-games are the linguistic activities and practice almost interconnected with our forms of life or permeate our life forming our natural history which is set in learning and mastering the techniques for correct use. The language-game idea cannot exclude reality, but excludes solipsism and metaphysics,i.e. it can accept only the notion of human reality which doesn't need further ontological commitment.

We will go over the interpretations of question B.:

IV 1) community/agreement:

I community (communication):

a) based on forms of life, or culture (Brinkley 1973:96),

b) language-use and language-game's rules as complete systems of human communication are governed by publicity, observable communal and normal behaviour (Hardin 1959, Hintikka 1969:81,1976:20, Brand 1975:121, Klenk 1976:49—66),

c) against private language choice and against the recognition of the fact the »interacting« with the wider community is supposed (C. Wright 1981:104—106, Leich, Holtzman 1981:5, Kripke 1982:78—79,89,95).

The behaviouristic background to this problem it is not correct to use, for instance, Chihara (1965) spoke only of logical behaviourism, and Baker (1981:58) impugns the interpretation in behaviourism-key.

## II agreement:

a) agreement in forms of life, but the agreement doesn't decide what is true or false (Binkley 1973:109, Dilman 1973:212),

b) agreement in deed and practice as interpersonal public agreement in enough cases (agreement in judgment, in fixing the rules etc.) for normal communication (Binkley 1973:94, Dilman 1973:VIII,123,174,216, Brand 1975:23,127, Cooper 1975:82, Klenk 1976:61, Hintikka 1978:353—356,1980:417, Peacocke 1981/73, Baker 1981:63, Putnam 1981:108, Kripke 1982:92,93,96,99).

## V map 2) criterion/following the rules:

### I criterion:

a) as part of the common form of life, form-of-life rooted (Dilman 1973:190,212, Earle 1978:304),

b) as amore general issue connected with the following rule (Baker 1981:48),

as amore special issue connected with verification (Baker 1979:271),

c) as public, external and defeasible (Winch 1958, Baker 1974, Hintikka 1975:193,1980:420—422, Klenk 1976:61).

### II following the rule:

a) is determined by natural facts:

psychological, sociological, physical (Bogen 1972:188),

by uses, institutions (Brand 1975:111), or community (Peacocke 1981:72—73, Kripke 1982:89),

b) is actually automatic, by examples trained application of rule, what is exhibited as checking what we normally do — fitting for new occasion too (Bogen 1972:186, Dilman 1973:215, Cooper 1975:39, Brand 1975:128, Baker 1981:63, Blackburn 1981:170).

It apparent that it is possible that all mentioned interpretations of B. question combine into two opinions:

1) IV map 1) I a), II a),

V map 2) I a), II a),

2) IV map 1) I b), II b),

V map 2) I c), II b).

We can neglect, it is obvious, IV map I c), V map 2)Ib), d) interpretations of B. question, as we neglect Dummett's denial of criterion for winning a game (1959 a:7).

Now we shall try to compare two opinions with Wittgenstein's texts:

Ad) opinion 1):

in favour IV map 1) II a) (PI I 241),

in favour V map II a) (BRB 17, 96, RFM I 116, PI I 199,

Ad) opinion 2):

in favour IV map I b) (BRB 81, PG I 51, 56, 83, 139, 140, RFM I 112, 151, PI I 2, 3, 182, 206, 224, OC 298),

in favour IV map 1) II b) (PR 19, PG I 82, RFM I 118, II 47—48, 66, 67, 72, V 2, 8, 32, 35, PI I 242, 425, Z 76, 348, 351, 428—431, OC 156, 203),

in favour V map 2) I c) (BRB 24—25, 57, 185, PG I 26, PI I 141, 190, 238—239, 258, 288, 290, 580, 692, Z 715—716, RC 29),

in favour V map 2) II b) (BRB 12—13, 34, 142—143, RFM I 3, 33—34, 113—114, 162, V 31—32, 35, 45, PI I 54, 82, 142, 147—151, 182—241, 198, 201, 202, 217, 219, 223—235, Z 293—295, 299, 300, 309, OC 26—29, 34, 43—47, 61—62, 95, 139—140).

Comparing the interpretations of B. question with Wittgenstein's texts we can see that he gives more support to opinion 2) IV map 1) I b), II b), V map 2) I c), II b).

The next step is the analysis of the objectivity which will offer the resolution of B. question.

VI map Wittgenstein's concept of objectivity (interpretations):

1) Objectivity is saved:

a) because the objectivity of knowledge is granted by (FL) (Gill 1966),

b) because the notion of public objects is granted obtaining the same results in public space and time by training (Gram 1971:298—299, Klenk 1976:46, 124),

c) in following a rule consideration founding the new objectivity which nobody can decisively refute (Baker 1981:31, Peacocke 1981:72—73),

d) the remnant of objectivity in the idea about error (Dilman 1973: 123, C. Wright 1980:273, 221),

2) the scepticism of dismissal of a claim of objectivity (Leich, Holzman 181:2, C. Wright 1981:99, Kripke 1982:97, 207).

Wittgenstein's texts show:

Ad) VI map 1) b), c) and d) in PI the same as ad) IV map 1) II b) and V map 2) II b, OC 74, 179, 193, 194, 196, 245, 415, 563, 645—653, 659—676.

At what kind of new objectivity did Peacocke only hint? The answer is clearer when we combine VI map 1) b) and c) with Wittgenstein's support of opinion 2) in the relation of B. question. Then we obtain: the language use and language-game's rules as complete systems of human communication are governed by publicly observable

communal and normal behaviour. It is built upon an agreement in deed and practice as interpersonal public consensus in enough cases of judgment, in fixing the rules etc. By public, external and defeasible criteria the rules are followed automatically by training on examples and by application which is exhibited as checking what we regularly do, or as we are able to fit into new occasions also. The new objectivity is in interpersonal public agreement on linguistic behaviour. Such a notion of objectivity is easy to connect to the notion of intersubjectively revisable proceeding in science, which after Heisenberg (1927) eliminated the principle of causation first imperiled by Hume's scepticism and what exchanged rationalistic for empirical causation. Kripke did not sufficiently perceive, as far as this is concerned, the advantage of Wittgenstein vs. Hume (1981:107—109).

The question C. (interpretations):

VII map 1) the general notion of justification:

I justification in suitable language-game (Dilman 1973:87, Hintikka 1980:419, Kripke 1982:74—75).

II beyond justification is (FL), way of life, or agreement with general practice, or reference to community (Binkley 1973:102,99,226, Dilman 1973:117, Putnam 1981:107—109, Kripke 1982:77,89).

In Wittgenstein's texts we find:

Ad) VII map 1)I(BRB 65,RFM I 19,II 18,41,74, V 33, 45, LC p.22, PI I 217,261,265,267,289,323,378,482,485—486,II<sub>xi</sub>, Z 264,265—267, OC, 175, 192,359,553,638,RC, 91).

Ad) 1) II (PI I 325).

Evidently this is /for Wittgenstein/ the preferable interpretation 1) I.

VII map 2) verification (Interpretations):

a) Wittgenstein's verificationism is not neopositivistic, the verification is the method of the sense for the propositions (/Encyclopedia 1967: 333/ Hacker 1979:236, Backer 1979:245, Putnam 1981:111, 121—122),

b) Wittgenstein's verification as assertability-condition theory probably influenced the neopositivistic theory of verification (C. Wright 1980:9, Kripke 1982:75, 110—111).

Wittgenstein's texts show:

Ad) VII map 2) a) (PR 48, 59, 123, 161, PG I 109, II 39, PI I 136, 137, 353, II p. 212, RFM V 3, Z 331, 436, 676, OC 79, 279, 281, 510),

Ad) VII map 2) b) see later comment.

VII map 2) II proof (interpretations):

a) identification of verification and proof from Wittgenstein's anti-platonism, constructivism (Stroud 1996, Kreisel 1958, Dummett 1973: 507, 614, 7—8, 467, Brand 1975:33, C. Wright 1980:28, 56, 239),

b) unclassical, antirealistic notion om proof differs, however, from intuitionistic (Dummett: 1959 b:170—171, 175—176, 1973:618, 674, 1973 b: 300—1, C. Wright 1980:28, 239—241, 251—258, 340, 441, 459—460, Kripke 1982:75),

c) as custom and natural history (Brinkley 1973:98),

d) synthetic, not a completely intuitionistic, non-radical conventionalist and antiempirist conception of proof (Hintikka 1969:41, Klenk 1976:47, C. Wright 1980:40—41, 251, 318—319, 324—325, 346).

Wittgenstein's texts in favour of VII map II:

Ad) 2)II a) and b) see later comment,

Ad) 2)II c) (RFM I 63),

Ad) 2)II d) (PG II 374, PR 131, 161, RFM I 75—105, 156—161, 165, II 55, III 39, —42, V 6, OC 240—241, 292).

But we can find in Wittgenstein the notion of proof connected with training of the mathematical technique which belongs to agreement (RFM III 30), to consensus in society (RFM II 66—67), to a community bound together by science and education (OC 298), to the form of our culture, life (RFM I 152, 164) or as the part of an institution (RFM II 36).

*Surveying C. question we obtain as preferable for Wittgenstein VII map 1) 1, 2) a), 2) II d), that is to say: the justification in general is specified in suitable language-game, the verification as the method for the sense of the proposition is different in the relation to neopositivistic notion and the proof is a specific method of verification about which Wittgenstein's conception is synthetic, not completely intuitionistic, non-radical conventionalist and is antiempirist. Our comments to such a result of the comparison between interpretations and suitable Wittgenstein's texts must be more extensive than to the previous two questions, because our schema ignored some important Wittgenstein's texts and parts of interpretations that are not to be omitted.*

Although Wittgenstein initiated, as Kripke said, both the truth-conditional and justification-conditional approach using Frege's context principle (1982:74—75), it is apparent that for Wittgenstein the justification-conception is broader, specially in the later works. If we accept J. and M. Hintikka's thesis that justification is employed only in secondary languages (1980:419), supported as it is by Wittgenstein himself (BRB 66, PI I 289, II<sub>IX</sub>, Z 549, 553, OC 510), and if we extend it with the results of our analysis of C. question, we can say, (together with the subsequent Wittgenstein's texts), that justification is employed in various uses (PG II p./451), in various language-games — in so many ways as there are secondary language-games, i. e. in one way for mathematical propositions (PR 167, PG II 15, p. 423, RFM App. II 18, II 41), in another for other propositions (RFM V 33, 46, Z. 264—265, 549, OC 192, 315, 613, 620, 638). Justification gives the ground to the propositions (LC

p. 22, RFM App. II 17—18, V 13, PI I 480—481, OC 204), deciding for or against them and the difference between truth/false decision goes after the first decision (RFM I 17, 19, 20, OC 27—28, 74, 193, 204). Verification is the method of justification of propositions. On these grounds (PR 19, Z 437) discovering their sense by considering what verifies them (PG II, p. 458—459, PR 232, PI I 353), verification affords the decision concerning the cases when a proposition is true or false (PG II p. 452, 459, PR 148). This notion of verification is more comprehensible, if both Wittgenstein's terms, meaning and sense, are treated referentially.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, verification should consist of rules, the rules which govern the game to its end. (PG 182—83). So, Wittgenstein's conception of language and verification could have Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics as its logical developmental step.<sup>2</sup> And this could justify the claim that

<sup>1</sup> It could be said that in this respect there is a certain continuity between TLP and the later works considering the treatment of these terms. Namely, the meaning (Bedeutung) of words in a sentence in TLP had the referential character to an object (3. 203, 3. 22, 4. 024), and the sense was referential in respect with a sentence in a language as a whole (3. 3, 4. 021, 4. 022, 4. 063). In PI for example, he claims that in many cases meaning can be defined as the use of words in a language, and sometimes by means of showing the word's bearer, that is, the objects (PI I 43, 138, 139, 197, pp. 175—176). But, meaning is not identical with use (PI I 138, 561), and it depends on the role it plays in language-games (PI I 556, 560, 563), or in various contexts, that is, circumstances (PI p. 182). Sense is just the same use (PI I 20, 349, 421, pp. 190), use in a certain language-game (PI I 508, pp. 184, 190), in a certain context (PI I 117, p. 192). Thus, meaning and sense have the same characteristics, that is, they are constituted from the context and circumstances. He interchanges them too as, for example, »words or sense« (PI p. 223), that is, he reduces sense to meaning — by displaying that the meaning of words is the given use of sentence also (p. 175), the meaning of words gives the sense to the sentence (PI I 358). Analogous conceptions can be found in his other works too, as for example: BRB 65—66, 69; 10, 42, 170—171; 137, 138. Z 135; 131—140 etc.), see also interpretation of the relation between sense and meaning as the relation between two codes in PG (Festini 1982:498).

<sup>2</sup> Hintikka himself mentioned Wittgenstein's language-game idea in this sense (1974:52). Hintikka's conception of game-theoretical semantics can be understood as idealised processes of verification developed through the special game-rules applied by two opponents, one trying to verify, the other trying to falsify the sentence in question. At the end of the game the product is a true atomic sentence. If this happens, the opponent who verifies has won. But, in such semantical games, the truth is definable independently of what happens in any particular play (Hintikka 1968 a: 61—62, 1977: 34—36, Festini 1987:14—17). Wittgenstein said that two participants collaborate to solve a problem and a special rule is needed for winning (PG p. 294, 293), it is needed to know the method of the solution of the problem, which yields the result. The word »yield« is like the word »win«, or »lose«, and someone wins in the game if we know the rules of the game. The criterion for »winning« is a particular set of events in the game (PG p. 377). Sometimes Wittgenstein used the word »falsification« too (PR 232, PG I 83). Hence, Wittgenstein was very near to Hintikka's semantical games, but for a systematic development he lacked the mathematical notion of game which Hintikka richly used.

Wittgenstein's conception of verification is not neopositivistic, as well as the opposite claim, that it influenced it.<sup>3</sup> In relation to Wittgenstein's notion of verification there are two more questions open for discussion: a) the relation to Dummett's neoverificationism and b) paragraph 4.024 from TLP in relation to situational semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983). Wittgenstein didn't completely identify verification with proof. Proof is used in logic and mathematics (RFM II 44, 45). Proof is the method of verification for justification in mathematics (PG II 15, 33, RFM I 63, 68, 69, V 14). As such, proof is a specific verification method, because it alters the calculus, the grammar, it is a new idea, new sense, new concept, new system (BRB 41, PG II p 300, 367, 372—373, RFM App. I 10—17, II 12, 24, V 7, 51), as paradigm (PG II p. 419, RFM I 24—74, II 14, 28, 31, 38, 41) and model (RFM II 22, 23, 24, 33, 39, 41, 44). For Dummett this is ultraconstructivistic, radical conventionalistic and not a strictly finistic view (1959 b:181—2, 1970:249, 1973:618), for C. Wright it is an apparently conventionalistic (1980:5, 42) and non-radical finistic view (ib., 139—141). Yet Wrigley criticised the interpretations of Wittgenstein in a constructivistic and finistic manner (1978), see comment also ad VIII (map 1). Proof has the same purpose as verification in other games — to show, by winning or losing the game, how the results is yielded, i. e. to arrive at true or false sentences (RFM I 28, 33, 63, App. 1 2, 6, 7, IV 51). Dummett (1959 a:2) and C. Wright (1976:233, 1980:246) compared Wittgenstein's notions of winning and truth. For Dummett truth has no criteria for verifying »what constitutes the winning of a game« (ib., 7). On the other hand Wright objects that Wittgenstein identified mathe-

<sup>3</sup> We can also add the following: Wittgenstein's notion of verification was not so narrow as the neopositivistic empirical notion, but Carnap was right however that Wittgenstein influenced the neopositivistic conception (1935/1937:153). That is to say, Wittgenstein didn't reject direct verification and the verification in principle for natural sciences (PR 48,225,228,230,238, PG p. 221,223,OC 510). Perhaps this is the reason why the neopositivistic term »confirmation« was not so strange to Wittgenstein. (Bekräftigung, Bestätigung) the term, which substitutes, after Carnap, for the term verification (see PR 228,238, PG p. 221, RFM V 4, Z 549, OC 203,241). But Wittgenstein was not content with the empirical notion of verification, this being the reason why he emphasized the difference between proof and experiment in many texts (RFM I 30—39,156—162,II 23,39,42,55,72, PI I 169p. 180,218OC 337). C. Wright thinks that this difference shows Wittgenstein's antiempiristic view (see 1980:318—341). The difference between the hypothesis and verification (BRB 25 PR 228, PI I 82,109,325,pp.212,OC 167) shows the same but the clearest difference between the narrow empirical verification and his wider notion he made in the following manner — the propositions of the first kind get treated »as something test by experience« and »another as a rule of testign« (OC 98). Consequently he spoke of the whole systems of verification which a »human being acquire by means of observation and instruction« (OC 279), or the verification notion which embraces the neopositivistic notion and is wider than it at the same time (PR 160,201,228, PG p.221, RFM V 29, OC 510). Baker supported such an interpretation when speaking of Wittgenstein and Waismann (1979:270—271). Obviously the verificational-game notion is the right conception for his language-game idea.

mathematical truth with provability, what associates the notion of truth with the criteria of verification (1980:28). Wittgenstein neither dissociated or associated them. Proof is the method for determination of the sense of mathematical propositions, proof belongs to the sense of the proved proposition (PG II p. 371, 374, 375, PR 114, 161, 166, RFM V 6). The mathematical proposition with its sense must belong to a system of propositions, i.e. to a calculus of mathematics, and proof must belong to a system of proofs (PR 153, PG II p. 376). So Wittgenstein made the difference between proof and truth, (PR 122, 131, 149, 153, 154, 167, PG II p. 366, 374—375, RFM App. I 8, App. II 9, II 28, 41, 46, 47, 59, V 6, 19). The truth/falsity is contained in mathematical proposition »as is its sense« (PG II p. 453), and it is yielded in the end as the result which is obtained by various techniques of proofs (BRB 19, 28—29, 61, PR 160, 163, PG II p. 383—386, 388, 395, 397, RFM II 60). Consequently, mathematics is a »motley of techniques of proof« (RFM II 46), and the mathematician the inventor (RFM I 167); mathematics is a movement within the rules of our language (RFM I 164) and the mathematician »is always inventing new forms of description« (RFM I 166).

Now is right place for the interpretations of Wittgenstein's texts which are directly related to the antirealism/realism question.

#### VIII map Wittgenstein's antirealism (interpretations):

1) Wittgenstein's antiplatonism, the generalisation of intuitionistic antirealism, his constructivism or ultra-constructivism (Stroud 1956, Kreisel 1958, Bernays 1959, Dummett 1959 b:178, Hintikka 1976:22. C. Wright 1980:39, 251—252, see also VII map 2) II a),

2) Wittgenstein impugns only a particular version or realism, for pain-ascriptions (Dummett 1978:XXXV),

3) Wittgenstein is the critic of metaphysical realism (Putnam 1981: 121).

Wittgenstein ad) VIII map:

Ad) 1) see later comment,

Ad) 2) (PI I 384),

Ad) 3) (BRB 48—49, 57, 70, 178, PR 85, PI I 47, 58—59, 68, 82, 96, 402, 403, Z 59—60, 413—419).

We can find ad) 1) the texts which show that his antiplatonism is not generalised intuitionism (PG II p. 293, RFM I 164—165, II 9, PI I 384, II<sub>xt</sub>). He refuted finitism (RFM App. II 18). Interpretation 1) impugned Shwayder as early as 1959 and Frongia (1981:86) argued that after PR, PG and RFM such severe judgments lost their persuasibility. Interpretation 2) shows that Dummett evidently changed his previous opinion. The third interpretation, as we see, is not repulsive to Wittgenstein and it remains open to the possibility to understand realism in another way, which is revealed by the next map.

## IX map Wittgenstein's realism (interpretations):

1) a) the connection of the grammatical systems, or language-games with reality, its place in the forms of life, or world, or life we live, or what we do (Hintikka 1968 a:56, Winch 1969, Bogen 1972:191, 192, 215—6, Dilman 1973:183, 18, Binkley 1973:105, Brand 1975:123—124, 110, see also Imap 3.

b) the language-games as rule-governed human activities are the connection with the world, or link with reality (Hintikka 1968 a:56, 1969:27, 48, Toulmin 1975:XI, Hintikka 1976:8, 10, 11, 13, 1978:355, Margolis 1978:557, Hintikka 1983:201, 1984:30, 34—35),

2) the picture, the proposition, the representation are supposed to represent an already existing reality and us in it (Brand 1975:41),

3) all mentioned ad) 2) must be checked or measured against reality (Dilman 1973:162, Hintikka 1976:8).

## Wittgenstein ad) IX map:

Ad) 1) a) see I map 3) a) and b) in Wittgenstein approach,

Ad) 1) b) (PG I 45, 46, 105, 109, 112, 113, 132, PI I 108, 205),

Ad) 2) (PG I 133, PR 47),

Ad) 3) (PR 13, 14, 19, 21, 27, 28, 41, 44, 47, PG I 79, 85, Z 233, 236, 261, RFM I 5, 9, 93, 94, 118, II 4, 36, 74, V 12, OC 492).

Hintikka called interpretation 1) a) the »received views« which only saw »horizontal« relation between different occasion of language use, underlined by the later Wittgenstein, forgetting that Wittgenstein did not lose interest in the »vertical« connection between language and reality (1980:417). Even in TLP (6.1625), as said Hintikka, Wittgenstein thought that the sentence does not reflect the structure of reality, it is a starting-point for certain picture construction (1969:42, 43, 51—52).

This is also a comment on IX map 2) is, in addition, clearly asking 3) characterisation.

So we have as an acceptable line of thinking the suggestion that Wittgenstein's position is realistic in a special, wider sense, that permits his texts which favorise IX map 1) b), 2) and 3), or VIII map 2) and 3), becoming stronger by support from the solutions of A., B. and C. questions.

That is to say: *we obtained a new criterion of realism*: the general notion of reality, objectivity as intersubjectively revisable proceedings and the nuances in the approach to truth. Adding other research results (Festini 1987:19), we have the following map of realism:

1) Frege-Tarski-Carnap truth-conditional realism,

2) Frege-Wittgenstein justification/verificationist realism,

3) Frege-Wittgenstein-Hintikka verificationist/falsificationist realism

The question concerning Frege-Wittgenstein-Dummett neoverificationist realism will thusly be opened as line 4.

## References:

1. Baker, G. P., 1974, »Criteria: a new foundation for semantics«, *Ratio*, 16, pp. 156—189.
2. Baker, G.P., 1979, »Verehrung und Verkehrung: Waismann and Wittgenstein« in: Wittgenstein Sources and Perspectives« C.G. Luckhardt ed., Hassocks, The Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 243—286.
3. Baker, G.P., 1981, »Following Wittgenstein. Some Signpost for Philosophical Investigations par. 143—242« in: »Wittgenstein: to Follow a Rule«, S.H. Holtzman, C.M. Leich eds. London, Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 31—72.
4. Barwise J., Perry J., »Situations and Attitudes«, Cambridge Mass., The MIT Press, 1983.
5. Binkley T., 1973, »Wittgenstein's Language«, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
6. Black M., 1978, »Lebensform and Sprachspiel in Wittgenstein's later work« in: »Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought«, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 325—331.
7. Blackburn, S., »Rule-Following and Moral Realism«, in: cfr. ref. no.3. pp. 163—191.
8. Bernays P., 1959, »Comments on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics«, *Ratio*, pp. 111—122.
9. Bogen J., 1972, »Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language«, London New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
10. Brand G., 1975, »The Central Texts of Wittgenstein«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979.
11. Carnap R., 1936/37, »Testability and Meaning« (»Controllabilità e significato«) n: »Analiticità, significanza, induzione«, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971.
12. Chihara C.S., Fodor J.A., 1965, »Operationalism and Ordinary Language: a Critique of Wittgenstein«, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2, pp. 281—295.
13. Cooper D.E., 1975, »Knowledge of Language«, London New York, PRISM Press.
14. Dilman I., 1973, »Induction and Deduction«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
15. Dummett M., 1959a, »Truth« in: »Truth and other enigmas«, London, Duckworth, 1978. pp. 1—25.
16. Dummett M., 1959 b, »Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics«, in: see ref.no.15), pp. 166—186.
17. Dummett M., 1970, »Wang's Paradox«, in: see ref. no. 15) pp. 248—269.
18. Dummett M., 1973, »Frege, philosophy of language«, London, Duckworth, 1981<sup>2</sup> (1973).
19. Dummett M., 1973 b, »The Justification of Deduction«, in: see ref. no. 15), pp.290—319.
20. Dummett M., 1978, Preface, in: see ref.no.15),pp.IX—LI.
21. Dummett M., 1981, »The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy«, London, Duckworth.
22. Earle W. J., 1978, »Wittgensteinian Criteria« in; see ref. no. 6), pp. 303—306.
23. »The Encyclopedia of Philosophy«, 1967 Edwards P. ed. New York, London, Macmillan Pub., 1972.<sup>2</sup>
24. Engel S. M., 1975, »Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language«, The Hague Martinus Nijhoff.
25. Festini H., 1982. »Is Wittgenstein's Concept of Proposition in PG Intensional, Extensional, or something Else?«, in: »Language and Ontology«, Wien, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 498—500.

26. Festini H., 1987, »Antirealism/Realism of Hintikka's Game-Theoretical Semantics«, *Radovi Fil. fak. u Zadru*, 26(3), 1987, pp. 13—21.
27. Frongia G., »Guida alla lettura su Wittgenstein«, Urbino Argaglia ed., 1981.
28. Giam M. S., 1971, »Privacy and Language«, in: »Essays on Wittgenstein«, Klemke E. D. ed., Chicago London, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1971, pp. 298—328.
29. Gier N. F., »Wittgenstein and Forms of Life«, *Philosophy of social sciences*, 10, pl. 241—258.
30. Hacker P. M. S., 1979, »Semantics Holism: Frege and Wittgenstein«, in: see ref. no. 2, pp. 213—243.
31. Hardin C. L., 1959, »Wittgenstein on Private Language«, in: see ref. no. 28), pp. 173—187.
32. Hintikka K. J. J., 1968 a, »Language-Games for Quantifiers«, in: »Logica, Language-Games and Information«, Oxford, Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 53—83.
33. Hintikka K. J. J., 1968 b, »Behavioural Criteria of Radical Translation: A Comment on W. V. Quine's *Word and Object*«, in: ib., pp. 83—98.
34. Hintikka K. J. J., 1969, »Quantification and Picture Theory of Language«, in: ib., pp. 26—53.
35. Hintikka K. J. J., 1971, »Quantifiers, Language-Games, and Transcendental Arguments«, in: ib., pp. 98—123.
36. Hintikka K. J. J., 1974, »Quantifiers vs. Quantification Theory«, in: »Game-Theoretical Semantics«, E. Saarinen ed., Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub., 1979, pp. 49—81.
37. Hintikka K. J. J., 1975, »On the Limitation of Generative Grammar«, in: »Proceeding of the Scandinavian Seminar of Philosophy of Language«, vol. 1, Uppsala, pp. 1—92.
38. Hintikka K. J. J., 1976, »Language-Games«, in: see ref. no. 36) pp. 1—27.
39. Hintikka K. J. J., Provence M., 1978, »Wittgenstein on Privacy and Publicity«, in: see ref. no. 6, pp. 353—363.
40. Hintikka K. J. J., and M. Hintikka 1980, »Different Language-Games in Wittgenstein«, in: »Language, Logic, and Philosophy«, Wien, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 417—422.
41. Hintikka K. J. J., Kulas J., »The Game of Language«, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. 1983.
42. Hintikka K. J. J., 1984, »A Hundred Years Later: The Rise and Fall of Frege's Influence in Language Theory«, *Synthese*, 59, pp. 27—49.
43. Hunter J. F. M., 1968, »Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations«, in: see ref. no. 28), pp. 374—394.
44. Klenk V. H., »Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics«, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
45. Kreisel G., 1958, »Wittgenstein's /Remarks«, *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*, 9 pp. 135—158.
46. Kripke S., »Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982.
47. Lang M., »Wittgenstein's Philosophische Grammatik«, Den Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
48. Leich C. M., Holtzman S. H., 1981, »Introductory Essay: Communal Agreement and Objectivity«, in: see ref. no. 3, pp. 1—31.
49. Malcolm N., 1954, »Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'«, *Philosophical Review*, 63, pp. 530—559.
50. Margolis J., »An Alternative to Rationalist and Empiricist Theories of Natural Language«, in: see ref. no. 40), pp. 555—557.
51. Putnam H., »Reason, Truth and History«, Cambridge, Camb. Univ. Press, 1981.

52. Peacocke C., 1981, »Rule-Following: The Nature of Wittgenstein's Argument«, *in*: see ref. No. 3), pp. 72—99.
53. Rankin K. W., 1966, »Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding and Intending«, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 3, pp. 1—13.
54. Sherry P. J., 1977, »Religion, Truth and Language-Games«, London, Mcmillan.
55. Shwyder D. S., 1969, »Wittgenstein on Mathematics«, *in*: »Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein«, P. Winch ed., London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
56. Stroud B., 1956, »Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity«, *in*: see ref. no. 28), pp. 447—464.
57. Toulmin S., 1969, »Ludwig Wittgenstein«, *Encounter*, 32, pp. 58—71.
58. Toulmin S., 1975, »Introduction«, *in*: see ref. no. 24, pp. IX—XV.
59. Winch P., »The Idea of Social Science«, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
60. Winch P., 1969, »Introduction« *in*: see ref. no. 55), pp. 1—20.
61. Wittgenstein, L., »Tractatus logico-philosophicus« (the german original), 1921, Sarajevo, V. Masleša, 1960. (TLP).
62. Wittgenstein, L., 1929/30, »Philosophical Remarks«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975<sup>2</sup> (1964), (PR).
63. Wittgenstein L., 1932/34, »Philosophical Crammar«, R. Rhees ed., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, (PG).
64. Wittgenstein L., 1933/34, »The Blue and Brown Books«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980<sup>6</sup> (1958), (BRB).
65. Wittgenstein L., 1934/37, »Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics«, G. V. Wright, R. Rhees eds, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1972<sup>2</sup> (1956), (RFM).
66. Wittgenstein L., 1938, »Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. C. Barrett ed., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1978, (LC).
67. Wittgenstein L., 1929/45/48, »Zettel«, G.E.M. Anscombe, G. H. V. Wright eds., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967, (Z).
68. Wittgenstein L., 1950/51, »On Certainty«, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. V. Wright eds., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970, (OC).
69. Wittgenstein L., 1950/51, »Remarks on Colour«, G.E.M. Anscombe ed., Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1978<sup>2</sup> (1977), (RC).
70. Wittgenstein L., 1952, »Philosophical Investigations«, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974<sup>7</sup> (1953). (PI).
71. Wright C., »Truth-conditions and Criteria«, *in*: »Proc. Arist. Soc. supp vol.«, 1976.
72. Wright C., »Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics«, London, Duckworth, 1980.
73. Wright C., »Rule-Following. Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning«, *in*: see ref. no. 3), pp. 99—118.
74. Wrigley M., 1978, »Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics«, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 27, pp. 50—59.
75. Zabbeeh F., 1971, »On Language Games and Forms of Life«, *in*: see ref. no. 28), pp. 328—374.

*Heda Festini: ANTIREALIZAM/REALIZAM WITTGENSTEINOVE IDEJE O JEZIČKOJ IGRI*

## Sažetak

Wittgensteinova ideja o jezičkoj igri dopušta da se nađe ne samo anti-realističke nego i realističke tendencije što iziskuje napuštanje klasifikacije na realističke i antirealističke (konstruktivističke, instrumentalističke) pristupe u semantici i metodologiji znanosti koji su nastali u filozofiji matematike. Upotrebom relevantnih autora o Wittgensteinovom djelu (Dummett, Baker, Hintikka, Kripke, C. Wright itd.) dobiva se opsežniji pojam o realizmu preko narednih pitanja:

A. ljudska realnost: prirodna povijest ili forme života (ponašanje, praksa, trening, običaji i institucije — jezičke igre i korektna upotreba),

B. nova objektivnost: zajednica, slaganje (kriterij — slijeđenje pravila),

C. nova nijansa u pojmu istine: opravdanje, verifikacija (dokaz kao jedna metoda verifikacije).

Rezultat analize bit će važni elementi za novi kriterij realizma: opći pojam realnosti, objektivnost kao intersubjektivnost i nijanse u pojmu istine.

Novim kriterijem dobiva se ovaj pregled realizma:

1. Frege-Tarski-Carnap istinosno-uvjetni realizam,
2. Frege-Wittgensteinov opravdanje/verifikacijski realizam,
3. Frege-Wittgenstein-Hintikka verifikacijsko/falsifikacijski realizam.

Mogućnost za Frege-Wittgenstein-Dummettov neverifikacijski realizam ostaje otvoreno pitanje za dalje istraživanje.