The conception of logic and epistemology in logical positivism

Abstract

Alongside a brief historical account of the rise of the Viena circle, the author lists the main viewpoints concerning tlie conception of logic and epistemology inaugurated in the work of Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Moritz Schlick. A possible critique of the logical positivist conception of logic-mathematics resides in the appearance, for example, of alternative geometrical models of a non-Euclidian character where it is shown that logical-mathematical judgements do not only contain a tautological character. The epistemological positions of the followers of logical positivism remain within the framework of so-called traditional epistemology. The author emphasises the conflictual points of these epistemological viewpoints (foundationalism and coherentism) proffering a possible critique from the standpoint of a naturalized approach to the questions of the theory of knowledge.