WITTGENSTEIN'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAME IN
»ON CERTAINTY«

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It is well known that Wittgenstein wasn’t interested in epistemic claims (A. Gargani, 1982), or epistemology, not until the last years of his life (A. Kenny, 1973), when he wrote «On Certainty» (1950—51). Our task isn't to expose his answer to the sceptical question which he elaborated partly against Moore and especially against Descartes though the last has not been mentioned. The theme of this paper is to investigate the possibility which the logico-syntactical approach of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar has for the principal epistemic terms, like belief and knowledge.

The analysis is guided by considering P. K. Moser’s (1988) interpretation of paragraph 253 from «On Certainty». The result is that his critique of doxastic theories in Pollock’s classification (1986) of the contemporary epistemological theories for unexhaustivity is not adequate, because the same lack is shown by undoxastic theories.

Through the epistemic terms like doubt, ground/ reason, foundation/ basis and those already mentioned, it follows that Wittgenstein’s epistemological frame heads to direct realism, challenging the confusion in Pollock’s classification, discovering the current of Wittgenstein’s hints at the same time.

The following framework is offered in posing the problem of «On Certainty»: much of our knowledge are beliefs adopted by learning from text-books or from the teacher. In such manner we learn various language-games and science.

So we develop our system of knowledge in which we believe and according to which we act. In the same way we form our systems of doubts, and the original language-game develops by abandoning many of our beliefs; the knowledge begins to grow

1 The present article is based on the author’s lectures in the Institutes of philosophy in Graz and Salzburg, held in January 1989. The author is indebted for organisation, support and comments to Prof. Weingartner and Prof. Zecha (Salzburg), to professors Haller, Elisabeth List, Gombocz (Graz) and to other members of both staffs and to the students too. Most of the notes are the result of discussion and of additional literature, such as some final definitions and the conclusion.
in the later stage. The religious beliefs are the firmest, because any reason against them does not cause doubt. We are taught the empirical ground (Begründung), but the things in which we definitely believe are learned by us by our own experience and our own action.

1. Some knowledge is belief

1.1. Difference between belief and know

G. Ryle (1949) in «The Concept of Mind» does not by turns the terms «belief» and «know» emphasizing that 'belief' suggests trust without the possibility of proving something and 'know' means that we are not possibly wrong, because we have relevant evidence. Klausner and Kuntz consider it impossible either in science, or in belief (in religious belief of course) to do without the basic, i.e. ungrounded beliefs (1961:31). Wittgenstein's view is different and more modern.

Some beliefs are considered by Wittgenstein as knowing, but he tried to mark the difference between them. In some cases, he thought, it is better to say «I don't believe it, I know it» (424). It is not correct to say «I know that the law of induction is true», it is more correct to say «I believe in the law of...» (500). The possibility of knowledge about physical objects, for ins. «cannot be proved by the protestations of those who believe that they have such knowledge» (488).

The difference which he emphasized saying «I know or only I believe» is obvious on the first glance. He repeated several times that same idea (364, 366—8, 380—1, 485—6, 492, 520—1). Such a difference is very clear if we say «I know...» or only «I believe...», because the second way is wrong (425). We cannot say «I believe in physics», but «I know that physics is true», and not «He knows it, but it isn't so». It is supposed «I know» expresses the relation between me and the fact, «I believe» between me and the sense of the proposition (90). Further difference he explains in relation to know as the ability to answer the question «How does he know», and in relation to belief as an incapability to answer the question «why he believes it» (550). In terms of language-games if somebody says that he knows something, he must be, by general consent, in a position to know (555), and we never say that somebody is in a position to believe something (556). 'Knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories, the second being typical for believing (161, 239—242, 340, 386, 526). The knowl-
edge expresses certainty (582) which is different from the certainty of believing, because the first includes the other person who in understanding is not different from me (563). Consequently, the difference between knowing and believing is not in me (489—490). It very clear difference is found the following: for to know we look for ground-reasons, a belief has no justification — in the first case it is possible to prove the truth (243), in the second the reasons cannot be more certain than the statement itself (243), hence a belief has not a justification (175)." 

1.2. Belief or/and know

If one learns in a certain way, then he says that he knows and we believe in all what we know (177, 218). We believe that we know, because we have confidence in text-books (600) and in all we were taught (289—291). I am convinced that the others believe

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2 We can read as following definitions:

— (know p but — p) (602),

believe p but — p (42).

They demonstrate something analogous to Plato's distinction between knowledge and belief as it is explained in bay the analytical vocabulary J. Hintikka:

a knows that p — p (it is valid implication)

a believes that p — p (it is often false) (1974:11).

It seems, that Wittgenstein speaks about the strong concept of knowledge, which can be defensible, according to the word of Weingartner, by J. Hintikka, R. Chisholm and Weingartner himself explaining as following: "the person a knows that p* means *knowing p emplies that p is true* (1981:146).

Other paragraphs in this text show that Wittgenstein used, so to speak, an exclusive concept of rational belief, which Weingartner explains:

»If someone believes something he does not (yet) know it; and if he knows (already) he does not (need any more to) believe it« (1981:144, 1982:243).

In favour of a) we find the group of paragraphs: 364, 366—8, 380—1, 485—6, 520—1, where his »I know or only I believe« we can consider as reverse of:

believe p — — know p.

The direct form of previous definition is par. 500, and almost directly illustrated a) by Wittgenstein is his treatment of religious belief, which is the theme of the author's article forthcoming in Filozofska istraživanja, Zagreb.

Prof. Weingartner's assistant in favour of b) suggests to read Wittgenstein's par. 424, here mentioned. But, we can define Wittgenstein's »I don't believe it, I know it« as:

— believe p, know, p, which is a somewhat reverse form of the suggested reading:

know p — — believe p.

The direct form we find in par. 90.
they know that all is so (288). The sentence »I know...« expresses »the readiness to believe certain things« (330), and we know with the same certainty with which we believe a lot of assumed things (340). We believe and know (218) a nest of propositions (225), because from our learning arises all our system of knowledge (286).

1.3. Belief as know

We believe on the ground of learning (171) in an entire body of our knowledge which was handed to us (288). Consequently, we believe in geographical, chemical and historical facts (169—170), in one word, we believe in proposition of natural science (167) which is a source of all our beliefs (234—8, 209). Besides, we believe in other things which we have learned — concerning our body (250—4, 325—7), our practical use of things in connection with which we have learned countless language-games (374, 376—7, 476—80). But, when we begin to believe in something, it is not individual propositions, but all the system of propositions (141) which gradually forms an entire system of belief (144). One believes in some things with such a conviction that it becomes a system, a structure (102); with unshakeable conviction »it is anchored in all« questions and answers (103) that it is the departure for every of our argumentations, test, confirmation and falsification of hypothesis (105). Hence, belief as knowledge is actually a learned knowledge in which we believe.

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3 Here we see two kinds of definitions:
know p −→ believe p (177, 218, 330, 340)
believe p −→ know p (600, 289—291),
and »we believe and know« (218), which indicates that the second (weak) claim is contained in the first, i.e.:
know p believe p . believe p −→ know p, hence:
know (believe) p −→ believe (know) p.

As an illustration there follows the text in 4.1., especially an entire line of paragraphs in 4.1., and the text in 4.2. So we can conclude (and prof. Weingartner suggests this), that here is present »the main theorem as a condition for rational belief, which Prof. Weingartner explains as: »... if someone knows something he also believes it« (1981:143). Such Wittgenstein's principal epistemic notion is illustrated in 1.3. in the title »belief as know« and it is conclusively developed in 4. as b/k.
2. Certainty, doubts, mistakes

2.1. Belief — doubts and certainty

We have no room for doubts in things which stand firmly (234, 247) and looking at this and this and liestening to that and that one is not in a position to doubt (280). We do not doubt in calculation (337), in statements in normal circumstances (333—4) and we are not taught to doubt when we see later the same object (472), i.e. we do not doubt if we have the system inside which some of these doubts cannot exist (247). This is »the rock bottom« of our conviction (248), on it we act with certainty which does not know for doubt, hence we do not accept anyone’s experience or proof which is against our belief (360). In »I believe it with certainty« in the word ‘certain’ we wish to emphasize our »complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people« (194). But, if we act with certainty which offers belief, then it is not surprising, says Wittgenstein, »that there is much we cannot doubt« (331). Consequently, in the first line Wittgenstein considers certainty of belief as subjective certainty.

Kant’s notion of the subjectively sufficient and the objectively insufficient belief (after Klausner, Kuntz, 12—13) is considered by Wittgenstein as subjective certainty. The term ‘certainty’ is connected by Kant with objective sufficincy, i.e. with knowledge. Wittgenstein wrote enough about subjective certainty. If I act with complete certainty, thinks Wittgenstein, then it is my own certainty (174). »I believe...« in such a case expresses subjective truth (179). To be perfectly certain expresses personal attitude (404), hence it is not senseless that others doubt what I »declare to be certain« (629). Wittgenstein is not interested in »to be certain« (308), because it concerns subjective certainty which he criticises in many places (30,194,245,415,563).

2.2. Know — certainty, doubts and mistakes

Instead of »I know« sometimes we can say »I am sure it is so« (176), or »There is no such things as a doubt in this case« (58), or »I can’t be making a mistake« (633).

Since as a concept knowledge is coupled with that of the language-game (560) certainty is not something to which we can more or less approximate, but »this language-game just is like that« (56). The definition of the language-game resides in certain-
ty (497), because certainty is its nature (457). Many paragraphs are concerned with the so-called objective certainty, because actually it is our issue here and which we shall comment later, in connection with 4.1. He says that we are certain in normal circumstances (250, 423, 441, 622), in the context of the situation (347–50, 406, 423), not outside the context (532–3, 535, 554), since in language-games we are in the position to know (396). We are as certain in everyday propositions as we are in empirical facts (306), for instance, this is my hand (441, 446), and we are certain in some empirical and in mathematical propositions (447–8, 654–667).

What defines a language-game is that one keeps his certainty even if somebody tries to arouse various kinds of doubts (497). Doubt presupposes the certainty, says Wittgenstein in 12 places (115, 160, 283, 310, 316, 329, 341, 368, 450, 472, 519). It is not doubting behavior if it is not non-doubting too (354). The possibility of the language-game does not depend on everything being doubted that can be doubted (392). Some doubts are not in our game (316). For our language-games it is essential that at certain points no doubts appear (523–4); it gradually loses its sense (56), because doubt without its end is not doubt at all (626). The absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game (370) and this does not falsify the language-game (375). One never learn the language-game if he calls in doubt those things in which we have no doubts (394, 329). He said he could give countless examples (371), the examples with hands (19, 306, 371, 456), with legs (409) and others (328, 337, 345–6, 490; 613; 510; 519). We use them all as empirical facts which are beyond doubts (519). We use them all as empirical facts which are beyond doubts (519). And he adds that we can not doubt in some empirical propositions if making judgements is to be possible and action too (308, 232), hence some empirical judgement must be beyond doubts (519). We cannot doubt in some geographical dates which are connected with existence (20, 316–17). Mathematical propositions are exempt of doubt, as many non-mathematical propositions are (653). An experiment is not possible at all, if there are not some things that one does not doubt (337); in general, the logic of our scientific investigation implies that certain things are indeed not doubted (342). Besides, doubt is not reasonable in certain objects (this is a tree 394, 452–4), etc. (522). In certain situations it is not reasonable to doubt either (he wasn’t in the stratosphere 218–222, never on the moon 338, or if someone says: I go through door (391). In all these cases there are no ground-reasons for doubt, because the question whether one needs the grounds for doubt (122) is answered, whenever one looks, he does not see the ground for doubt that... (123). The grounds for doubt
simply do not make any sense in such and similar cases (4, 306: that is an arm, 387, there is a tree).

Actually, the question is »how is doubt introduced in in language-game?« (458). Generally, the statement »I know...« is subject to doubt (121, 178). Wittgenstein says: »(My) doubts form a system« (126). All this is explained with a statement that a reasonable person in such and such circumstances doubts that (334). Since what is reasonable is alterable, the question of objectivity arise again (336). Further argumentation of doubt is found in his list of characteristic cases — only in the language-game a doubt about existence works (24), it is possible only if words are used isolated (372), or isolated proposition (274). It is not possible to say for any such individual case »such and such must be beyond doubt« (519). If the ground for doubt is needed (458) it is the reason (459) and so the ground must not itself be doubtful (516).

In such a way one needs to show objectively that »I am not making a mistake about that« (16, 15). There is a difference between a mistake for which the position is prepared in the game and a complete irregularity which occurs as exception (647). In the first case, if I make a mistake which shows to my statement its position in the game, »that doesn't detract from the usefulness of the language-game« (637). Therefore one does not know the truth about some point with perfect certainty with a mistake being excluded (404—5). As a mistake has a cause and a ground if somebody makes a mistake, »this can be fitted into what he knows aright« (74). However, some types of cases exists where, says Wittgenstein, »I can rightly say that the mistake I can't make. I can list different types« (675—6), »but not give any common characteristics« (674). Nevertheless, he tried to give them in certain sense, i.e. to list some characteristics. The statement: »I can't be making a mistake« is used in practice as the principle of human research (670—1), as emphasis of the value of certainty of statement (638), or as a means for persuasion (669), also as addition of something particular to the generally accepted (664—5). One mistake is not expected in the future if our knowing is based on the behaviour of something in certain circumstances in the past (559, 624—5), or in various cases which stand fast (425, 567—9, 570, 574, 577, 628, 642), it is difficult to make a mistake about one's own name (528), the majority of people do not make mistake about their names (628).
3. Grounds

3.1. Grounds for belief

Subjective certainty excludes the possibility of giving the grounds, i.e. it does not give justification. Hence, Wittgenstein rightly puts the question: "Why is it supposed to be possible to have grounds for believing something if it isn't possible to be certain?" (373). The answer we find in his consideration of the grounds for believing. He states that from the beginning of learning, as we have already seen, we not do doubt in a lot of things, although we have no right, good grounds for believing them (91, 283). As a matter of fact we have no grounds for non believing. If a pupil refused to believe in some information (this mountain had been there beyond human memory), we would say that he "had no grounds for this suspicion" (322). We have no reason not to believe in teaching of the existence of something (of earth: 182, or of Napoleon: 186), we have no grounds not to trust text-books for experimental physics (600), etc. (516). But if we believe on grounds of what we learn (171), asks Wittgenstein, is then a belief grounded? (173). He searched for the answer by means of another question — is it wrong that a proposition of physics is guiding our actions, must we say that we have no good ground for doing so, is not "this what we call a 'good ground'?" (608). Hence, some of our beliefs have grounds too and more explicit — it is difficult "to realize the groundlessness of our believing" (166). It is obvious that some of our beliefs have grounds, which is illustrated by the cases described, as we have seen, and for some of them we cannot find justification (175), and to them it is difficult to remove the grounds, i.e. to which it is needed to remove the grounds, as for religious beliefs for whose grounds it is apparent, because they are not our game (609, 612), since such believers do not believe the grounds of critics (336). Here would follow the objection on par. 253, but we shall come to this in 4.2.

3.2. Grounds for knowledge

It is not easy to give the grounds for our knowledge. If we are certain and have not any doubt about something, still we cannot give grounds for our way to go on, or there are thousands, but none so certain as it is supposed for the ground to be (307). It seems that "I know" prescind from all grounds (574). It does not reveal the ground for our decision for or against our proposition (200), because the ground is neither true nor false
We can say that something is true, but on the demand for grounds, we might say »I can't give« any grounds (206). Neither is the experience the ground for our game of judging (131). But, »it must be possible to test whether I know it« (574). Besides when we say »I know« it might turned out to be wrong (580).

Surely »I know« expresses the readiness to give compelling (243) and convincing grounds (563) for such knowing. But it is wrong from the point of view of the language-game that it is possible at the end to »adduce such grounds as we hold to be grounds« (599). In particular circumstances it is possible to give the grounds for the statement one knows (111), but it is important that giving the grounds must satisfy the other that is in the position to know (438—441). The others will accept our statement »I know«, which often means that one has his own ground for it, if they are acquainted with the language-game (18). Sometimes with »I know« we assure somebody in the certitude of our grounds, when one does not already know which »would have compelled the conclusion that I knew« (431), i.e. if everybody takes for granted that that it is known (439). So, it is not »telling grounds for something« what »I decide« (271). My past experience can not be a ground, but fused with other experiences (429, 275). Such is various everyday knowledge which is visible through our action as material experience (499), which compels us as we have compelling grounds making certitude objective (270). He gives many examples; to know to have toes (430), to know that this room is on the second floor etc. (431, 416, 412—414, 417—421). For the mathematical propositions we give the grounds by proof (563).

In general, it follows that in an appropriate language-game we can give to it appropriate grounds which will justify our knowing.

4. Belief/knowledge (b/k)

We separated the consideration of belief from that of knowing with the aim to show in a more detailed way that Wittgenstein, in some cases, made a very clear difference, but very often he considered them together, especially if he thought of such knowledge which he held believing. Sometimes he mentioned beliefs, actually belief/knowledge, what is shown by the comparison between 1.2. and 1.3., where we can find the same paragraph — 288. We find the same in the comparison 1.3. with 2.1. where we are compelled to repeat par. 234. Particularly suitable for our
sintgma belief/knowledge (b/k) are the comparison inside 2, and inside 3.

4.1. Comparison of 2.1. and 2.2.

Considering certainty and doubt in connection with belief and knowledge it is still more clear that Wittgenstein considered the knowledge as belief. The first draws one's attention to the scarcity of data in 2.1. which we can leave. Then, there was a problem with the examples too, because a lot of them are identical in 2.1. and 2.2. We find enough paragraphs in which, in fact, the certainty borders on both, i.e. on our b/k, as for ins. in connection with facts about the world, about my body, about empirical propositions and in science (92, 136—7, 162—3, 167, 170, 209, 245, 273—5, 286, 340, 360, 308, 582—3). The best argument in this sense is the objective certainty which Wittgenstein opposed to subjective certainty, because the objective certainty touches exactly b/k. When Wittgenstein argues that the knowledge is not subjective he opposed it to subjective certainty as believing, i.e. to the belief which is not knowing. In this sense it is possible to interpret already mentioned paragraphs in 2.1 (179, 194, 245, 415, 563). Subjective sureness does not exist for knowledge, he argues, because certainty is subjective, not knowledge and truth (179, 245). If »I believe that I know« does — not need« to express lesser degree of certainty«, then here one does not speak about the greatest subjective certainty, but that certain propositions »underlie all questions and all thinking« (415), i.e. something is objectively certain if it is not possible to make mistakes (19, 194), and this is possible, as we have seen in 1.1. when the other person is not separated from me by »a difference in understanding« (563). Such objective certitude (270) can be still better understood if we add 274 to the quoted paragraphs 272 and 273 in 2.2, where he explains that the objectively certain countless empirical propositions give the experience which teaches us »host of interdependent propositions«. The objective certainty shows evidence in the language-game which speaks for our proposition (203) and our belonging to the »community which is bound together by science and education« (298).

All this is characteristic also for doubts and the examples are the same. Besides, to our sintagma b/k the entire text about language-game in 2.2. is directed. Hence, we can conclude: Some propositions of belief (Pb) are not justified (J), because they are subjectively certain. Subjective certainty is related to believer,
not to belief. It is not possible to justify the believer, because his propositions are not objectively certain (OC). However, some propositions are objectively certain. The justification gives the objective certainty, but if some propositions are objectively certain, they are the propositions of b/k. Hence, we can take the scheme...

Some P OC are b/k and they can be J
In which way they are justified is shown especially 4.2.

4.2. Comparison between 3.1. and 3.2

Mentioning the lack of grounds for doubt, characteristic for both, belief and knowing, Wittgenstein again speaks about b/k, because the analogous examples illustrates both. They are examples from everyday life, or from learned things. Although the good and right grounds do not exist for beliefs, he said, we have no the grounds for non believing. As we must have the grounds for doubts, so we must have the grounds for knowledge — the reasons and the justification we can have for »I know«, but not for belief — evidently, for b/k we can have. Such is Wittgenstein's effort to combat the sceptical argument against b/k, i.e. weaker concept of knowledge.4

Evidently, Moser's comment on par. 253. moves in other direction. He considered such text as foundation doxastic epistemological theory, i.e. as acceptance of unjustified beliefs as foundation for the justification of all other beliefs, although he admits that unjustified basic beliefs have »a feature that distinguishes them from the basic beliefs of foundationalism«, what Pollock's doxastic epistemological theories make non exaustive (1988: 132—133). But his thesis was that »Wittgensteinian view is unacceptable in its account of inferential justification« (133).

In our line of interpretation we must first indicate the wrong in English translation of the quoted paragraph. The German text is: »Am Grunde des begründeten Glaubens liegt der unbegründete Glaube«, and the English translation in the book, edited by Anscombe and von Wright is: »At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.«

4 Weaker concept of knowledge is in use by »Most of scientist today« (Wein-gartner, 1981:146—147). So the strong concept of knowledge is supported also by »suitable weaker concepts like different kinds of belief and assumption for expressing weaker statement« (147). Wittgenstein used the term assumption, too, see 4.2. and the note 5.
The right translation would be:

At the ground of grounded belief lies ungrounded belief. After such translation it is easier to see that the par. 253 very well illustrates what we said about religious beliefs in 3.1. That is to say, the religious beliefs appears as very well grounded beliefs (336), but, after Wittgenstein, behind it there is the ungrounded belief (609, 612). As the game which is not ours is spoken about here, Wittgenstein mentions the difficulty of removing such a ground, what is already said in 3.1. Hence, this paragraph is not related to b/k which is in the centre of our analysis. We must draw attention to the translation and the use of the terms 'die Grundlage', 'das Fundament' and 'fundamental' too and keep them separately from 'der Grund'.

Wittgenstein thinks that our justifications have the end (192, 204, 213), as has giving the reasons (412), i.e. with giving the grounds (die Begründung) (110, 204). At such an end we do not obtain the certain proposition which immediately strikes us as true (204). That is ungrounded (unbegründete) presupposition, »it is an ungrounded way of acting« (110). We do not obtain any kind of seeing the true proposition, but »our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game« (204). For or against our proposition speaks our language-game (203). So we can say that the appropriate language-game (LG) gives the grounds (G) for some propositions. Giving the grounds, i.e. the end of chain of reasons is at the end of game when it crosses in act, because the language-game is part of acting. Our acting is ungrounded, because the same game is, as Wittgenstein says, »something unpredictable«, it is not »grounded« (begründet), »It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there — like our life« (599). Here are connected also Wittgenstein's terms 'form of life' and something 'animal'. Namely, objective certainty which b/k is carried out, although dissatisfied Wittgenstein called it »form of life« (FL) (358), as something which lies outside justified and unjustified, as it is something »animal« (A) (359). Hence, we can give the schema:

Some P b/k are J on G LG

With the bottom of the language-game Wittgenstein fused the other terms — die Grundlage, das Fundament, fundamental. Our world-picture is »die Grundlage« (translated as »the matter-of-course foundation«) for our research (167); he spoke also about die Grundlage (translated — foundation) in connection with all judging (614) and all our beliefs (246) — so it is something that »must be taught us as a foundation« (die Grundlage) (449). When Wittgenstein spoke about some empirical propositions he mentioned the most fundamental things (»fundamentalsten
Dingen«) about which we do not change the opinion, »That is just what their being 'fundamental' is («fundamental« 512) and about them we make the statements which appeared fundamental («fundamental«), so if they are false, what is 'true' or 'false' anyway? (514). They are »fused into the foundations («das Fundament«) of our language-game« (558). All such our assumptions («die Annahme«) in the entire system of our language-games (LGs) belong, as he said, to foundations (F) («das Fundament«), the assumption (As) »forms the basis («die Grundlage«) of action, and therefore, naturally of thought.5 (411). Schematic b/k can be shown in relation to foundation/basis (F):

Some P b/k are fused with F LGs, they are As

Returning to the term ground we can connect it with the so far discussed fundamental empirical propositions — As, and such propositions we call, says Wittgenstein, »empirical ground« (Begründung) (296). So, some empirical propositions (EP), which are fundamental (FEP), we call empirical ground propositions (EGP), i.e. some P b/k are empirical fundamental-ground propositions-assumptions (EGP-As). Schematic the definition is:

Some EP which As are called EGP-As, i.e. some P b/k are EGP-As

If we connect the last definition with FL and A we can draw the picture:

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FsL (A)

LGs is part of action, or form of life (PI, 19, 23). They originate and disappear under circumstances, but about such circumstances the language-game does not speak anything (618). Hence the definition:

LGs + Ac = FsL (A).

5 Wittgenstein's concept of assumption as support of the strong concept of knowledge is evidently closer to the strong kind of assumption than to weak, in Weingartner's sense of words (see, 1982:247. For a weak kind it is not inconsistent that aAp · Aa − p).
This would be our natural history.

5. Conclusion

Consequently, we obtain the final definition of $P_{b/k}$:

Some $P_{b/k}$ are EGP-As because fused with $F_{LGs}$ whose background is $F_{SLS}$ (A).

The last definition discovers clearly that it is suitable to consider Wittgenstein's epistemological frame as direct realism, instead the doxastic (foundation) theory.

We can draw the epistemological framework which guided Wittgenstein, such as: we learn $b/k$s, later some of them become strong knowledge, others remain weak knowledge (belief) supported by the empirical assumptions of strong kind; some of them remain belief which never become of either kind of knowledge.

If we accept the thesis that Wittgenstein's epistemological frame leads to direct realism, and if the foundation doxastic theory is internalist and we said that Wittgenstein's theory is not such, we face the question: is it possible to develop a direct realism in framework of undoxastic externalist theory, i.e. is it possible to be probabilistic or reliability theory, after Pollock's taxonomy. Or is it both, i.e. something else, which would show that Pollock's classification of contemporary epistemological theories is not exhaustive for undoxastic theories either, as Moser remarked for doxastic theories earlier.

Further argumentation is needed to be developed in such a direction, on the basis of Wittgenstein's other books too and accounting also for our note 6.

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* Our picture which affirms the plural of language-games and forms of life evidently agrees with R. Haller's advocacy of their plural against to the singular of N. Garver (cfr. R. Haller, 1988:129, 114-128). More than this it is important to take into account the term 'form of culture' which Wittgenstein mentioned already in BRB (p.143) and RFFZd (I,152). Such a possibility must put in difficulties Wittgenstein's term 'animal', here mentioned, and offer to his other term — 'natural history' another interpretation, also important for the further development of his epistemology.

7 See Moser, op.cit. p. 131.
REFERENCES
