Schelling’s Logic of Ground in 1809

Abstract

Schelling’s seminal 1809 Freedom Essay is an answer to perceived accusations of pantheism, and therefore an occasion for Schelling to rethink his own monism or “All-Einheitslehre.” In an attempt to creatively reinterpret the pantheist trope expressed by the phrase “God is all things,” Schelling will consecrate the opening pages of his Freedom Essay to a rereading of the principle of identity. This paper seeks to elucidate the development of Schelling’s theory of identity, paying particular attention to its oldest sources, especially Plato’s theory of the “soul of the world,” Kant’s teleology, and Gottfried Ploucquet’s logic. It will argue that Schelling gives equal importance to the theory of identity, and a revised version of the principle of sufficient reason, which we will call “the principle of ground.” This will give rise to the foundational distinction of the 1809 Essay, the idea of God having a ground that is in him, but not to be confused with him insofar as he exists. To say that “God is all things” is therefore a description of how parts and wholes interact in an organic system, or more specifically, how microcosmic systems relate to the overarching macrocosm to which they belong.