Dummett's Conception as theory of meaning for Hintikka’s type of game-theoretical (II), (Wittgenstein's verification conception
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15291/radovifpsp.2675Abstract
In this part of the development of the theme, attention will be paid to the very original concept of verification found in Wittgenstein. The analysis is devoted to the 100th anniversary of his birth.
The purpose is to show that this concept is not the first formulation of the strict principle of verification, as Carnap (1936-37) meant, but to seek such a verification / contrac- ture theory that includes the concepts of verification / counterfeiting, proof and confirmation / anticipation of late neopositivity / analytical philosophy and proving the lime elemental tools of today's science.
Wittgenstein has reformulated Duhem's general concept of verification as the principle of verification and falsification in the concept of checking the rules and thus got the original theory that must be compared to each later.
References
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Max Black, Margins of Precision, Ithaca, London, Cornell Univ. Press, 1970.
Gordon Baker, »Vereherung und Verkehrung: Waismann and Wittgenstein« in Wittgenstein, Sources and Perspectives, C. G. Luckhardt (ed.), Hassokcs, The Harvester Press, 1977, pp.243-286.
P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modem Physics, New York, 1927, cited after G.H.R. Parkinson, The Theory of Meaning, Oxford, Oxford Uniw. Presss, 19702 (1968), p.ll.
Rudolf Carnap, »Testability and Meaning«, 1936/37 in Analicita, significanza, induzione, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971.
Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundation of Probability, after J. L. Cohen, see the next reference.
Johnatan L. Cohen, »Logica indulliva (1945-1977)« in Logiche modeme, Vol. sec. Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani, 1981, pp.333-354.
Kenneth Collier, »Hinlikka’s Epistemic Logic«, in Jaakko Hintikka, R. J. Bogdan, J. Niiniluoto (eds.), Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Comp., 1987, pp. 181-199.
Ilham Dilman, Induction and Deduction. A Study in Wittgenstein, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973.
Pierre Duhem, »La theorie physique: son objet et sa structure«, 1906, one part in Scientific Knowledge, J. A. Kourany (ed.), Belmont, Wadsworth Pub. Comp. 1987, pp. 158-169.
Heda Festini, »Antirealism/Realism of Hintikka’s Game-Theoretical Semantics«, Radovi, 26(3), 1986/1987, pp. 13-21.
Heda Festini, »Antirealism/Realism of Wittgenstein’s Language-Game Idea«, Radovi, 27(4), 1987/1988, pp. 5-20.
Aldo Gargani, »Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy in Connection with the Works of Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann«, in Language, Logic and Philosophy, R. Haller, W. Grassi (eds.), Vienna Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1980, pp. 179-182.
Aldo Gargani, »Schlick and Wittgenstein: Language and Experience«, Grazer Philosopische Studien, 16/17 (1982), pp. 347- 364.
Rudolf Haller, »Metaphysik und Sprache«, in Grundfragen der Wissenschaflen und ihre Wurzeln in der Metaphysik, P. Weingartner (ed.), Salzburg-MDnchen, Universitiitsverlag, 1967. pp. 13-27.
Rudolf Haller, Question on Wittgenstein, London, Routladge, 1988.
Michael Hand, »Radu Bogdan, ed. Jaakko Hintikka. Norwood, MA: Reidel 1987.«, Canadian Philosophical Reiews, VIII, 3 (March, 1988), pp. 84-86.
Carl Hemmpel, »Der Wiener Kreis: Eine Personliche Perspektive«, in Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism, Vienna, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1979, pp. 21-27.
Kaarlo J.J. Hintikka, »On the Limitation of Generative Grammar«, in Proceeding of the Scandinavian Seminar of Philosophy of Language, vol. 2, Upsala Univ. Press, pp. 1-982.
Kaarlo J.J. Hintikka, and Merril Hintikka, »Different Language-Games in
Wittgenstein«, in Language, Logic and Philosophy, Vienna, Holder Pichler-Tempsky, 1980, pp. 417-422.
Kaarlo J.J. Hintikka, »Replies and Comments«, in Jaakko Hintikka, R. J.
Bogdan, I. Niiniluoto (eds), Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Comp., 1987, pp. 277-347.
V. H. Klenk, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics, The Hague, Martinus Nijhof, 1976.
Arne Naess, The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise, Oslo, London, Universitetsforlaget, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972.
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, Hutchinson, 19685 (1934).
Willard v.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, New York, Harper, 1963 (1953).
Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the Extrenal World, 1914.
Moritz Schlick, »Uber das Fundament der Erkenntnis«, Erkenntnis, vol. 4, 1934, cited italian translation: Sul fondamento della conoscenza, »La scuola« editrice, Brescia, 1966.
Moritz Schlick, »Meaning and Verification«, Philosophical Review, 45 (1936).
Friedrich Waismann, »Logische Analyse der Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs«, Erkenntnis, I, 1930.
Friedrich Waismann, »Verifiability«, 1945, rep. in G.H. Pa rkinson, cit. reference no.4), pp. 35-60.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, »Notes dictated to G.E. Moorein Norway«, 1914, in Notebooks, 1914-1916, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979J (1961), pp. 108-119, (NMN).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, cit. ref. no. 31), pp. 2-91, (N).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Sarajevo, V. Masleša, 1960, (TLP).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, »From Weismann’s notes«, 1929-931, in Philosophical Remarks, R. Rhees (ed.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, pp. 317-347, (WW 1).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, »From F. Weismann’s shorthand notes of a conversation on 30 December 1930«, ib., pp. 245-297, (WW II).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Book, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980s (1958), (BRB).
Ludwig Wittge stein, Philosophical Remarks, cfr. reference no. 32), pp. 51-244, (PR).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, (PG).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees (eds.), Cambridge Mass. The MIT Press, 19722 (1956), (RFM).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, »Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough«, in Wittgenstein, Sources and Perspectives, cfr. ref. no. 3), pp. 61-82, (GB).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright (eds.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967, (Z).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 19747 (1953), (PI).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright, (eds.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979, (OC).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 19785 (1977), (C).
Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on Foundation of Mathematics, London, Duckworth, 1980.
